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ABSTRACT
Foreign direct investment is an essential aspect of our global
economy, yet the legitimacy of the current investment arbitral system
is currently being undermined due to an alleged perception of a lack of
arbitrator independence and a growing number of inconsistent and
conflicting investment decisions, leading to an incoherent body of
international investment law. Unpredictability in either investor
protection or state liability leads to increased risk in the investment
regime, and risk lowers foreign investment flows. Additionally, large
awards against states have led to some countries refusing to consent to
investor-state arbitration at all.
This Article intends to promote the creation of a World Investment
Court. This World Investment Court would increase consistency in the
investment regime and remove the perception that investment
arbitrators are biased towards investors, thereby promoting the
legitimacy of international investment law overall. This Article further
provides a look at inconsistent investment arbitral awards, and argues
that even though many arbitrators cite prior awards, the current
alleged de facto precedent is inadequate, and a “World Investment
Court” is necessary for the further development of international
investment law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Foreign direct investment (“FDI”) has grown dramatically within
the past several decades, and with it, the number of investor-state
disputes has risen. Because of the significant political risk taken by
investors in foreign states, promoting and protecting FDI requires a
judicial institution that can reduce risk to foreign investment and create
a consistent body of international investment law.1 FDI continues to be
generally unregulated on a global scale,2 and without this multilateral
cohesion, bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) have emerged as the
primary source of regulation for FDI. 3 At the start of 2016, there were
over 3,300 international investment treaties in the world, with more
than 2,900 BITs, and that number continues to grow.4 Concurrently,
the number of investor-state disputes has risen to over 600,5 leading
many—including the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) 6 —to
criticize the current investment arbitral system and call for solutions to
its structural problems,7 specifically the numerous inconsistent arbitral
decisions, the incoherent body of investment law, and alleged lack of
independence and impartiality of investment arbitrators.8
States have several types of dispute resolution methods that can
be used to resolve investor-state disputes: (1) “diplomatic” means such
as negotiation, mediation, diplomacy, and conciliation, and (2) “legal”
means such as arbitration and judicial settlement.9 However, investorstate arbitration is unique and distinct from many other forms of
1. STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 3 (2009).
2 . José E. Alvarez, The Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment, 42 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 2 (2003).
3. See generally Rachel J. Anderson, Toward Global Corporate Citizenship: Reframing
Foreign Direct Investment Law, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 1 (2009).
4. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, World Investment Report 2016,
101.
5. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, World Investment Report 2015,
114 (2015). See also Jack J. Coe, Jr., Margaret L. Moses, The Principles and Practice of
International Commercial Arbitration (Cambridge Univ. Press 2008), 113 PENN ST. L. REV.
1369, 1389 (2009) (book review).
6. World Investment Report 2015, supra note 5, at 120 (asserting “[t]he question is not
about whether to reform or not, but about the what, how and extent of such reform.”).
7. See, e.g., Jason Webb Yackee, Toward A Minimalist System of International Investment
Law?, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 303, 318 (2009) (citing scholars who have called for
a World Investment Court).
8. STEPHAN W. SCHILL, REFORMING INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (ISDS):
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND OPTIONS FOR THE WAY FORWARD 1 (2015).
9. See generally J. G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (5th ed. 2011).
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adjudication. 10 International commercial arbitration and investment
arbitration present different questions to the tribunal,11 as arbitrators in
commercial arbitration must decide whether there was a breach of the
underlying contract while arbitrators in investment arbitration must
decide the legality of states’ actions regarding foreign investments.
Essentially, investor-state arbitration is a form of public law 12 as it
involves deciding investment regulatory disputes between states and
private investors and is significantly distinct from private commercial
international arbitration, which consists of resolving private disputes
between private parties.13 But in international public law, while there
is a WTO to regulate and promote coordinated trade policies, there is
no supranational organization to regulate or promote international
investment. 14 To compound the issue, the proliferation of BITs
continues to cause numerous structural problems, particularly
inconsistent interpretations of treaty language and an incoherent body
of investment arbitral law. 15 Given the recent growth and rising
importance of FDI to the international financial world, there is an
increasing need for the establishment of a permanent World Investment
Court to create consistent investment decisions leading to a coherent
body of international investment law, and thereby protect and regulate
the growing regime of FDI.16
This Article analyzes and promotes the creation of a World
Investment Court to resolve international investor-state disputes. One

10. Joshua B. Simmons, Valuation in Investor-State Arbitration: Toward a More Exact
Science, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 196, 196 n.1 (2012).
11 . See Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija SA v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, ¶¶ 96, 113 (July 3, 2002).
12. See William Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public Law
Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 283, 28396 (“[M]uch of investment treaty arbitration today must be understood as public regulatory or
administrative law.” Id. at 289); see also Stephan W. Schill, Enhancing International Investment
Law’s Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law
Approach, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 57, 61 (2011).
13. GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 4 (2007).
14 . Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward A Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 287 (1997) (noting “The term ‘supranational’
has no canonical definition but is typically used to identify a particular type of international
organization that is empowered to exercise directly some of the functions otherwise reserved to
states.”).
15. Efraim Chalamish, The Future of Bilateral Investment Treaties: A De Facto Multilateral Agreement?, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 303, 340 (2009).
16. Id. at 335.
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scholar has proposed the idea of a World Investment Court in the past,17
while most scholars have criticized the proposal.18 The hope of this
Article is to reinvigorate the discussion surrounding the proposal for a
World Investment Court, and attempt to persuade critics that a Court
composed under the auspices of the WTO and comprised of tenured
judges appointed by the WTO contracting states would create a more
perfect system to resolve international investment disputes. As
discussed here, this World Investment Court would create a more
consistent interpretation of international investment treaties and
standardize international investment law, which in turn may increase
FDI flows due to improved confidence in investment protection19 and
provide states with a predictable framework to base future regulatory
actions.20 It is important to note that this Article will not focus on the
claim that the current investment arbitral system is inadequate—though
it may be in some respects—but the aim of this Article is to propose a
more complete and coherent system to resolve international investment
disputes. Furthermore, this Article will discuss a current attempt to
place this theory into practice—namely the bilateral investment courts
under EU investment treaties.
Part II of this Article will describe the current regulatory
framework of FDI, particularly BITs and FTAs as these are the most
prevalent agreements relating to investment. Part III will discuss the
current enforcement mechanisms for investment arbitral awards. Part
IV will focus on the reasons investment arbitration may not be the best
forum for deciding investor-state disputes, and will also discuss the
conflicts between the legitimacy and sovereignty of the state in
17. VAN HARTEN, supra note 13, at 180-84. Yet even this scholar is starting to back away
from his idea of an international investment court due to a growing pessimistic view of practical
implementation. Gus Van Harten, The System of International Investment, in ALTERNATIVE
VISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
MUTHUCUMARASWAMY SORNARAJAH 103, 104-05 (C.L. Lim ed., 2016).
18. See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law. By Gus Van
Harten, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 909, 914 (2008) (book review); Stephen W. Schill, The European
Commission’s Proposal of an “Investment Court System” for TTIP: Stepping Stone or
Stumbling Block for Multilateralizing International Investment Law?, 20 AMER. SOC’Y INT’L L.
9 (2016).
19. Cf. Susan D. Franck, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and
the Rule of Law, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 337, 347 (2007) (noting
“[t]here is mixed anecdotal evidence that investment treaties promote FDI.”).
20. Christina Binder, Necessity Expectations, the Argentine Crisis and Legitimacy
Concerns, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMON CONCERNS 198, 208
(Tullio Treves et al. eds., 2013) (noting that unpredictability and unclear guidelines are
detrimental to both states and investors).
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delegating its power to a supranational organization such as this
investment court. Next, Part V will look to the empirical value of the
proposed investment court between the United States and the European
Union, including critiques of the system. Part VI will discuss several
arguments against the World Investment Court and provide responses
to these criticisms. Part VII will then discuss the structure and function
of the proposed World Investment Court, including its jurisdiction,
appellate body, and precedential treatment.
II. CURRENT REGULATION OF FDI
First, to understand the reasons for this proposal of a World
Investment Court, it is necessary to understand the current system of
FDI regulation and its dispute resolution in the international sphere.
FDI is generally defined as: “a category of cross-border investment
made by a resident in one economy (the direct investor) with the
objective of establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise (the direct
investment enterprise) that is resident in an economy other than that of
the direct investor.” 21 The central purpose of FDI is for the direct
investor to acquire influence in the management of the foreign
enterprise, generally evidenced by the ownership of at least ten percent
of the voting power. 22 This definition covers a broad spectrum of
activities, as FDI can be created in many ways, such as establishing a
manufacturing plant or expanding an existing business into a foreign
state through a joint venture with a local company of that state. 23
Commonly, FDI occurs through a merger or acquisition of an existing
firm, but FDI can also occur through the creation of a wholly new
enterprise in a foreign country.24
However, states and foreign investors—often companies or
enterprises25—do not have the same international status, and therefore,
have unequal bargaining power. 26 Because investors of one country
21. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD BENCHMARK DEFINITION OF
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT ¶ 11, at 17 (4th ed. 2008).
22. Id.
23. LONE WANDAHL MOUYAL, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND THE RIGHT TO
REGULATE: A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE 6 (2016).
24. José E. Alvarez, The Public International Law Regime Governing International
Investment 15 (2011).
25. DAVID COLLINS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 18
(2017).
26. STEPHEN J. TOOPE, MIXED INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: STUDIES IN ARBITRATION
BETWEEN STATES AND PRIVATE PERSONS 386 (1990).
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and a foreign state in which that investor owns or manages a business
have different levels of bargaining power, many investors see FDI as
risky.27 This political risk generally includes the risk of civil unrest,
such as armed conflicts, and the risk of changing laws, regulations, or
state administrations. 28 Before the twentieth century, FDI was
protected primarily through diplomatic means, 29 but as threats of
expropriation or nationalization of foreign investments rose, states
began creating investment treaties, specifically BITs, to protect their
investors. 30 These investment treaties were originally purposed to
protect those rights of foreign investors in a host country, as protection
generally encourages the proliferation of FDI because foreign investors
would view their investments as less risky if they could enforce their
rights through a treaty.31 Outside of investment treaties, most investors
have little protection for their foreign investments against acts such as
expropriation or nationalization by a host country, 32 but due to
international investment agreements between states, investors can
bring claims against host governments before an international arbitral
tribunal rather than before the host country’s domestic courts.33 Most
investment treaties now provide foreign investors a standard set of
rights, including fair and equitable treatment and most-favored nation
protections. 34 Even though international investment law is still
relatively new, there has already been a sharp increase in international
investment disputes in the past two decades.35 However, unlike trade,
there is no international institution coordinating or regulating

27. Anderson, supra note 3, at 6.
28. MOUYAL, supra note 23, at 7.
29. Barnali Choudhury, International Investment Law as a Global Public Good, 17 Lewis
& Clark L. Rev. 481, 486 (2013)
30. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements, 12
U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 157, 168-69 (2005).
31. Id. See also SURYA P. SUBEDI, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: RECONCILING
POLICY AND PRINCIPLE 116 (2008) (“Although there is no credible evidence to suggest that
BITs have increased the flow of foreign investment from developed countries to developing
countries, they certainly have instilled a sense of security in foreign investors.”). Cf. Jeswald W.
Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 427, 468 (2010)
(noting the research that has questioned whether investment treaties do increase investment).
32. Vandevelde, supra note 30.
33. Christopher M. Ryan, Discerning the Compliance Calculus: Why States Comply with
International Investment Law, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 63, 67 (2009).
34. Franck, supra note 19, at 342.
35. TONY COLE, THE STRUCTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION xiv (2013).
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investment treaties, and the international investment regime remains
governed by scattered measures and treaties.36
A. Outer Sources of International Investment Law
There are several sources of international law that influence
international investment law. These sources do not bear directly on the
discussion here, but are worth noting as they impact investment law in
general. The first source is customary international law, often defined
as customs that states follow from a sense of legal obligation.37 There
are two general principles in customary international law relating to
FDI: (1) principle of territorial sovereignty over which the state has
exclusive jurisdiction; and (2) principle of nationality where each state
has an interest in appropriate treatment of its citizens, both at home and
abroad. 38 These principles of customary international law lay the
foundation for FDI policies and are examples of the competing interests
giving rise to investment law. Other principles of customary
international law play a part in forming investment law, such as the
principle of non-responsibility,39 and the principle that when private
property is taken by the state, there must be compensation for that
property (known as eminent domain).40
A second source of influential regulations on FDI is soft law.
“Soft law” is a special category of legal instructions, often perceived as
standards.41 While the definition of soft law is broad and uncertain, it
can generally be broken down into three categories: (1) nonbinding
decisions of international organizations and bodies; (2) bilateral or
multilateral agreements and declarations created together by states; and
(3) recommendations by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 42
These soft law norms are not legally obligatory, but can be part of the
36. GUIGUO WANG, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE 16
(2016).
37. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1113 (1999).
38. Rafael Leal-Arcas, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law, 35 N.C.
J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 33, 74-75 (2009).
39. Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Emerging Civilization of Investment Arbitration, 113 PENN
ST. L. REV. 1269, 1277 (2009) (noting that the principle of non-responsibility encompasses
where a state has legal obligations only to citizens of other states, and therefore, a claimant who
is not a citizen of another contracting state would lack standing to bring a claim).
40. COLLINS, supra note 25, at 29.
41. Id.
42. Laslo Blutman, In the Trap of a Legal Metaphor: International Soft Law, 59 INT’L
COMP. L. Q. 605, 608 (2010).
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complex framework that regulates international activity and can greatly
influence the conduct of international actors.43 Additionally, soft law is
often defined and influenced by non-state actors, such as NGOs, and
because of soft law’s growing influence over international hard law,
these non-state actors are beginning to greatly affect international law
as a whole.44 Some dislike the use soft law in regulating international
arbitrators because it introduces uncertainty,45 but soft law has certain
advantages in solving governance problems.46
B. Proliferation of International Investment Agreements
While these two sources described above may be influential, the
most important regulations of FDI are international investment
agreements (“IIA”), including BITs and free trade agreements
(“FTA”). 47 While some international treaties either indirectly or
tangentially regulate FDI, the first treaty to deal exclusively with
investment was the 1959 Germany-Pakistan treaty. 48 Since then,
primarily beginning in the 1990s, FDI has become an increasingly
essential aspect of the international economy, and many states have
liberalized their regulations to promote the flow of FDI, often through
the creation of BITs.49 BITs are essentially treaties between a “home”
state—state of the investor—and the “host” state—location of the
investment—to establish the terms of investment and protection of
FDI. 50 In the past, host countries were deemed open to FDI but
generally considered unsafe for investment, and many home countries
were concerned about potential discrimination against investors,
43. Id.
44. Avnita Lakhani, The Role of Citizens and the Future of International Law: A Paradigm
for A Changing World, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 159, 167 (2006). For a more detailed
discussion on soft law and international arbitration, see generally Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler,
Soft Law in International Arbitration: Codification and Normativity. 1 J. INT. DISP.
SETTLEMENT 283 (2010).
45. M.W. Reisman, Soft Law and Law Jobs, 2 J. INT’L DISPUTE 25, 25-26 (2011).
46 . Jiangyu Wang, State Capitalism and Sovereign Wealth Funds, in ALTERNATIVE
VISIONS, supra note 17, 405, 409.
47. JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 1-2 (2d ed., 2015).
48 . Jason Webb Yackee, Conceptual Difficulties in the Empirical Study of Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 405, 436 (2008).
49. Jürgen Kurtz, A General Investment Agreement in the WTO? Lessons from Chapter
11 of NAFTA and the OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON.
L. 713, 720-23 (2002).
50. Natasha Marusja Saputo, Paradoxical Pacts: Understanding the BIT Phenomenon and
the Rejection of a Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 41 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 121, 123-24
(2014).
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including the expropriation, nationalization, or devaluation of
investments. 51 From the host country’s perspective, a BIT seems
essential to attracting foreign investors by providing reassurances
against the potential loss of investment, and these converging interests
lead to the proliferation of BITs between home and host countries with
similar economic interests. 52 Within the past few decades, several
multilateral FTAs, including the North American Free Trade
Agreement (“NAFTA”) and the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (“ASEAN”), have subsequently emerged as regional
investment treaties.53
Over time, BITs have become more standardized and most
contain strikingly similar parts or even identical language,54 as many
IIAs are often drafted from several leading or model investment
treaties.55 While the provisions in most investment treaties are similar
in wording, the benefit of a BIT is that it allows for adjustment in each
individual agreement. 56 BITs provide some flexibility for each
contracting state to tailor the investment treaty to the relationship of the
states’ economic needs. 57 However, almost all BITs contain four
fundamental parts: (1) definition of investment, (2) treatment standard
for investors, (3) protections from and compensation for expropriation
or nationalization, and (4) a dispute resolution mechanism.58 Arguably,
the most important provision contained in these BITs is the dispute
resolution mechanism, discussed more below. Since the 1990s,
international arbitration has become the preferred dispute resolution for
both commercial and investment agreements. 59 Under these dispute
resolution mechanisms, states give their consent generally to submit
51. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 397-403 (2002)
(discussing the rule requiring “prompt, adequate and effective compensation” in the event of
expropriation by a host country).
52. Chalamish, supra note 15, at 308-09.
53. Id. at 330.
54. Id. at 323.
55. WANG, supra note 36, at 21.
56. Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing
Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1530
(2005).
57. Kevin C. Kennedy, A WTO Agreement on Investment: A Solution in Search of A
Problem?, 24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 77, 127-30 (2003).
58. Saputo, supra note 50, at 128.
59 . See NIGEL BLACKABY, CONSTANTINE PARTASIDES, ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN
HUNTER, REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION ¶ 810, at 469 (5th ed.
2009) (“Whilst in 1998 ICSID registered eight cases with 19 pending, in 2008 it registered 31
new cases with 128 pending.”).
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future investment disputes before an arbitral tribunal to resolve actions
relating the state’s authority over foreign investment.60
C. Regionalism and FTAs
Regional multilateral IIAs have initiated a step forward for
international investment law. Generally, an FTA is an agreement
between several states to reduce barriers to exports while protecting
FDI through the creation of a more stable trade and investment
setting. 61 Probably the one of the most notable example of this is
NAFTA, providing a complete regional agreement specifically
protecting FDI.62 While not strictly an FTA, the European Union has
many similar features to a regional investment agreement stemming
from the combination of two provisions in the Treaty Establishing the
European Community: Article 56—laying the foundation for the free
movement of capital 63 —and Article 43—defining the freedom of
establishment.64 The number of FTAs continues to grow, and recently
included the negotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership.65 However,
it is worth noting that this past year, Great Britain left the European
Union66 and the United States left the TPP,67 which may be signaling
60. See, e.g., Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Emerging Civilization of Investment Arbitration,
113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1269, 1270 (2009); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2012 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATY, art. 25 (2012) [hereinafter MBIT], https://www.state.gov/documents
/organization/188371.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NNJ-92WM] (last visited Oct. 21, 2017) (“Each
Party consents to the submission of a claim to arbitration under this Section in accordance with
this Treaty.”).
61. Free Trade Agreements, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
http://trade.gov/fta/ [https://perma.cc/764T-96YX] (last visited Oct. 21, 2017).
62. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 1101, Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289.
63. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, art. 56, 1997 O.J. C 340/1, 3
(prohibiting “all restrictions on the movement of capital between Member State and between
Member States and third countries”).
64. Id. art. 43, at 2 (prohibiting “restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals
of a Member State in the territory of another Member State,” including “restrictions on the
setting-up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State established in
the territory of any Member State”).
65. Free Trade Agreements, U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements [https://perma.cc/79KD-HYDR] (last visited Oct. 21, 2017).
66. Stephen Erlanger, Britain Votes to Leave E.U.; Cameron Plans to Step Down, N.Y.
TIMES, June 23, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/25/world/europe/britain-brexiteuropean-union-referendum.html.
67. Jeremy Diamond & Dana Bash, Trump signs order withdrawing from TPP, reinstate
‘Mexico City policy’ on abortion, CNN (Jan. 23, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/23/
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an international backlash to economic globalization, including that of
FDI.
III. CURRENT ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
Without an enforcement mechanism, an investment treaty would
be simply a political declaration lacking force. 68 This is one of the
revolutionary aspects of IIAs: the mechanism for foreign investors to
enforce their rights against a foreign state.69 Most modern investment
treaties now provide a substantive right for foreign investors to submit
claims to an international arbitral tribunal.70 To enforce an IIA in the
event of a violation by a state, a foreign investor must initiate the
dispute resolution mechanism contained in the IIA. 71 Usually, IIAs
provide jurisdiction of investor-state disputes to either the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”)72 or ad hoc
arbitral tribunals.73 But consent to arbitrate is required for an arbitration
to commence, and arbitral tribunals derive jurisdiction solely from the
consent of the parties.74
As IIAs are the general source of framework for the enforcement
of FDI protection, the starting point of its enforcement is the scope of
“investment” as defined in the investment treaty. Scholars have
identified five generally-accepted characteristics of an investment: an
investment (1) has a certain duration; (2) involves regular profit and
return; (3) typically involves risk for both investor and host state; (4)
requires substantial commitment; and (5) should be beneficial to the
host state.75 Similar to this definition, some investment tribunals have
followed the Salini test, derived from the decision in Salini v.
politics/trans-pacific-partnership-trade-deal-withdrawal-trumps-first-executive-action-mondaysources-say/ [https://perma.cc/76TS-G927] (archived Oct. 21, 2017).
68. Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the
Legitimacy of International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 471, 477 (2009).
69. Franck, supra note 19, at 343 (2007).
70. SCHILL, supra note 1, at 244.
71. Stephanie Bijlmakers, Effects of Foreign Direct Investment Arbitration on A State’s
Regulatory Autonomy Involving the Public Interest, 23 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 245, 251 (2012).
72. Calvin A. Hamilton & Paula I. Rochwerger, Trade and Investment: Foreign Direct
Investment Through Bilateral and Multilateral Treaties, 18 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1, 9 (2005).
73. Stefan D. Amarasinha & Juliane Kokott, Multilateral Investment Rules Revisited, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 119, 148-50.
74. RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 131
(1995) (“The consent of the two parties, both the governmental party and the investor, has been
called the ‘cornerstone’ of ICSID’s jurisdiction.”).
75. Hamilton & Rochwerger, supra note 72, at 12.
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Morocco, 76 for the definition of “investment” for purposes of
investment arbitral jurisdiction. 77 Under this Salini test, to be an
“investment” the activity must: (1) involve the transfer of fund or the
contribution of money or assets; (2) be of a certain duration; (3) have
the individual transferring the funds participate in the management and
risks; and (4) bring economic contribution to the host state.78
The definition of “investment” has become incredibly broad and
provides protection for most assets.79 We can look to the Model U.S.
BIT to see that “investment” broadly means “every asset that an
investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that has the
characteristics of an investment, including such characteristics as the
commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or
profit, or the assumption of risk.”80 Even the letter of submittal of the
Mozambique-United States agreement noted that under the treaty
“[e]very kind of investment is specifically incorporated in the
definition.” 81 While this definition is relatively widespread among
international investment treaties, the broad scope of “investment” still
sparks controversy and has created divergent ideas of what the
definition of investment should actually cover.82

76. Salini v. Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction (July 23,
2001).
77. COLLINS, supra note 25, at 5.
78 . Salini, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, ¶ 52 (“The doctrine generally considers that
investment infers: contributions, a certain duration of performance of the contract and a
participation in the risks of the transaction.”).
79. Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation
of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67, 80 (2005)
(“Most BITs define the concept of investment broadly so as to include various investment forms:
tangible and intangible assets, property, and rights. Their approach is to give the term
‘investment’ a broad, non-exclusive definition, recognizing that investment forms are constantly
evolving in response to the creativity of investors and the rapidly changing world of international
finance. The effect is to provide an expanding umbrella of protection to investors and
investments.”).
80. MBIT, supra note 60, art. 1.
81. Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Dec.
1, 1998, Mozam.-U.S., Letter of Submittal, art. I, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-31 (2000),
https://www.congress.gov/106/cdoc/tdoc31/CDOC-106tdoc31.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TE5S6D9F] (last visited Oct. 21, 2017).
82. COLE, supra note 35, at 1-2.
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A. Current Enforcement Regime: ICSID Convention and the New
York Convention
The current international investment regime is primarily enforced
through two conventions: the ICSID Convention and the New York
Convention. 83 The ICSID Convention is integral to the current
investment framework because it has created a forum and set of rules
specifically designed to address investor-state disputes.84 As of 2016,
161 states have signed the Convention and 153 have deposited their
instruments of ratification, making this Convention one of the more
widely accepted international treaties.85 ICSID was formed with the
purpose to “[p]rovide[] facilities for conciliation and arbitration of
international investment disputes,” 86 and the tribunal’s jurisdiction
extends to “any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment,”87
making the definition of investment critical to the ability of the investor
to initiate arbitration against a state.88 As noted above, once the scope
of “investment” is determined, the arbitral tribunal would then have
jurisdiction to review the dispute and hand down an award.
Arbitration requires party consent for the tribunal to have
jurisdiction, normally given in a contract between the parties. 89
83. SCHILL, supra note 1, at 242 n.4.
84. See Thomas L. Brewer, International Investment Dispute Settlement Procedures: The
Evolving Regime for Foreign Direct Investment, 26 LAW AND POL’Y INT’L BUS. 633, 655-56
(1995) (“One reason ICSID is important is because most bilateral investment treaties designate
it as the prospective arbitration center for disputes, refer to it as an appointing authority, or
indicate that its rules would be applicable in ad hoc arbitrations.”). See also ICSID Convention:
Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings part F, ICSID, http://icsidfiles.
worldbank.org/icsid/icsid/staticfiles/basicdoc/basic-en.htm [https://perma.cc/67P7-MX66] (last
visited Oct. 21, 2017).
85. INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES [ICSID], LIST OF CONTRACTING
STATES AND OTHER SIGNATORIES OF THE CONVENTION, (2016), https://icsid.
worldbank.org/en/Documents/icsiddocs/List%20of%20Contracting%20States%20and%20Oth
er%20Signatories%20of%20the%20Convention%20-%20Latest.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RA9BU3F] (last visited Oct. 21, 2017).
86. ICSID and the World Bank Group, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank
.org/en/Pages/about/ICSID%20And%20The%20World%20Bank%20Group.aspx
[https://perma.cc/7ECS-FHML] (last visited Oct. 21, 2017).
87 . See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States, art. 25, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter
ICSID Convention].
88. Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Emerging Civilization of Investment Arbitration, 113 PENN
ST. L. REV. 1269, 1280 (2009) (“One frequently-raised jurisdictional objection is that the dispute
in question does not involve an investment and thus fails to satisfy the requirements of the ICSID
Convention, the applicable investment treaty, or both.”).
89 . Bart L. Smit Duijzentkunst & Sophia L.R. Dawkins, Arbitrary Peace? Consent
Management in International Arbitration, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 139, 140 (2015).
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However, unlike commercial arbitration, in investment arbitrations,
IIAs provide the contracting state’s general consent to submit an
investor-state dispute to arbitration, while the source of the investor’s
consent is found through the request for arbitration.90 Generally, the
parties have broad discretion to constitute the tribunals, usually
consisting of an uneven number of arbitrators to decide the dispute.91
Normally, each party appoints one arbitrator and those two arbitrators
elect a third as the presider,92 and the arbitration proceeds according to
the rules provided in the BIT, generally ICSID Rules, ICC Rules, or
UNCITRAL Rules.93 Under the ICSID Convention, states can consent
to arbitrate investment disputes through ICSID tribunals, 94 but an
arbitral award given by an ICSID tribunal cannot be appealed and is
deemed as a final judgment in the courts of a sovereign state.95 Once
the award is given, the prevailing party must enforce the award in a
state, and the ICSID Convention requires each Contracting State to
recognize the award as binding and enforceable, providing only a very
limited set of grounds for annulment of the award.96 Unlike the New
York Convention, the ICSID Convention provides for annulment by
application to the Secretary-General and a committee of three ad hoc
arbitrators decide whether to annul the award, in full or in part.97
However, some investment arbitrations can be resolved through a
tribunal other than ICSID, in which the New York Convention98 would
apply to enforcement of the award.99 Similar to the ICSID Convention,
the New York Convention has widespread acceptance, with 156

90. WANG, supra note 36, at 63, 212-13.
91. Id. at 37.
92. Ray C. Jones, NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-to-State Dispute Resolution: A Shield to
Be Embraced or A Sword to Be Feared?, 2002 B.Y.U. L. REV. 527, 534-35 (2002).
93. Franck, supra note 56, at 1543.
94. ICSID Convention, supra note 87, art. 36.
95. Id. art. 53-54.
96. Id. art. 52(1) (“Either party may request annulment of the award by an application in
writing addressed to the Secretary-General on one or more of the following grounds: (a) that the
Tribunal was not properly constituted; (b) that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers;
(c) that there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal; (d) that there has been a
serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or (e) that the award has failed to state
the reasons on which it is based.”).
97. Id.
98. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. 42 [hereinafter New York Convention].
99. Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Role of Counterclaims in Rebalancing Investment Law, 17
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 461, 464 n.13 (2013).

16

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41:1

contracting states as of 2016. 100 But whether the investor-state
arbitration is under the New York Convention or the ICSID
Convention, the tribunal is typically conducted in a similar manner and
procedure. After the award is given, the New York Convention requires
each contracting state to recognize the award as binding and to enforce
an arbitral award. 101 While an arbitral award is binding under
international law, it is not necessarily final, at least not until it is
enforced by the state.102 The New York Convention provides a more
permissive set of grounds for refusing enforcement in a state than the
ICSID Convention, including refusal to enforce if the award is contrary
to the public policy of the country,103 and the recognition procedure is
completed through the domestic courts of the state rather than a
centralized body. 104 Taken together, the ICSID Convention and the
New York Convention provide the enforcement and recognition
procedures for international investment arbitration awards.
IV. ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTING A WORLD INVESTMENT COURT
At its core, investment arbitration is public international law, as
arbitrators of an investor-state dispute analyze and often restrict
sovereign governmental action. 105 Investment dispute resolution is
functionally different from private commercial arbitration in the
parties’ obligations at issue (namely the obligations that the host state
agreed to in the investment treaty and the investor responsibilities), the
parties’ relationship (a foreign investor against a state rather than both
sides private parties), 106 and the source of authority for arbitration
100. Status: Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(New York, 1958), U.N. COMM. ON INT’L TRADE L. (2017), http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral
/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html [https://perma.cc/5LF4-EHBN] (last
visited Oct. 21, 2017).
101. New York Convention, supra note 98, art. III.
102. MERRILS, supra note 9, at 100.
103. New York Convention, supra note 98, art. V (providing that “[r]ecognition and
enforcement of the award may be refused” on an exclusive and limited list of grounds) (emphasis
added). See also Jessica Rodriguez, Enforcement of Annulled Arbitral Awards in the United
States: Is A Return to Chromalloy Warranted?, 34 REV. LITIG. 379 (2015) (discussing the
permissive nature of the annulment grounds in Article V of the New York Convention).
104. New York Convention, supra note 98, art. V.
105. Stephan W. Schill, Enhancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of A New Public Law Approach, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 57, 67
(2011).
106. VAN HARTEN, supra note 13, at 140-44. See also René Urueña, Subsidiarity and the
Public-Private Distinction in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99,
105 (2016) (“The public-private division in investment arbitration can be defined in reference
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(commercial arbitration arising from private contracts and investment
arbitration arising from treaties). 107 Furthermore, investment
arbitration is significantly distinct from private commercial arbitration
because of the focus on a state’s actions, even described as a form of
global administrative law. 108 Under these IIAs, states give general
consent to resolve disputes with investors as a whole rather than
disputes relating to a specific relationship or contract like in private
commercial arbitration. 109 In consenting generally to all future
investment disputes, the state is acting in its sovereign power, as only
the state has the power to regulate FDI within its borders and, in effect,
this submits the state to an outside adjudication of its own sovereign
regulatory actions, resulting in what can be described as a “governing
arrangement.”110
To determine whether a World Investment Court would be more
beneficial to the international investment regime than the current
investment arbitral system, this Part will analyze the main reasons this
proposed World Investment Court is necessary. The principle focus
will be on the continuing conflict between legitimacy and sovereignty
in international tribunals, the transparency (or lack thereof) of
investment arbitrations, the independence of investment arbitrators,
and the necessity of consistent and coherent interpretations. This
Article will then make the argument that a World Investment Court
would satisfy these principles more sufficiently than the current arbitral
system, specifically in reinforcing the legitimacy of the system.
A. Legitimacy vs. Sovereignty
Investment arbitration, like most international tribunals, is
criticized for what many deem a “legitimacy crisis,”111 one where the
to four variables: (1) the legal regime applicable in investment arbitration; (2) the actors involved
in the dispute; (3) the function that investment arbitration fulfills; and, finally, (4) the issues
dealt with by the decision of the investment award and their overall impact.”).
107. S.I. Strong, Navigating the Borders between International Commercial Arbitration
and U.S. Federal Courts: A Jurisdictional GPS, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 119, 124 (2012).
108. Valentina Vadi, Global Cultural Governance by Investment Arbitral Tribunals: The
Making of A Lex Administrativa Culturalis, 33 B.U. INT’L L.J. 457, 473 (2015); see also Gus
Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global
Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 122 (2006).
109. Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV. 232, 232-33 (1995).
110. VAN HARTEN, supra note 13, at 63-64.
111. See MOUYAL, supra note 23, at 15-16 (citing scholars who have criticized the current
international investment law regime).
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most severe issue is the unpredictable and inconsistent investment
arbitral awards. 112 In investment arbitration, there is a continuing
conflict between state sovereignty and the legitimacy of the tribunal, as
a sovereign state has the right to regulate foreign investment within its
borders, but this regulation can infringe the rights of foreign investors
and restrict a liberal economy that is necessary to increase wealth for
both the home and the host countries. 113 This conflict may be even
more acute in the context of investment arbitration than in commercial
arbitration as investment arbitration actually analyzes and determines
the legality of a state’s sovereign action, which can directly infringe on
state sovereignty. Many prominent critics of international judiciaries in
general assert that formal international courts threaten state sovereignty
and national principles.114 Even in this proposal for a World Investment
Court, the conflict between legitimacy and sovereignty remains equally
present.
Sovereignty continues to be a contentious issue when states are
asked to delegate powers to a supranational organization, particularly
the idea that delegation will erode the powers of nation-states and even
impact the legitimacy of the nation-states themselves.115 International
investment law can threaten public law values, including democracy
and sovereignty. 116 Investor-state arbitration is one such situation,
where investors can bring claims against states before an international
arbitral tribunal rather than domestic courts, often directly challenging
a state’s power.117 But with the current increase in globalization, state
borders are becoming a less significant barrier to cross-border
investment, 118 and the traditional principle of state sovereignty is

112. Brower & Schill, supra note 68, at 473. But see Irene M. Ten Cate, The Costs of
Consistency: Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 418,
420 (2013) (“While not everyone subscribes to the assessment that this regime is in the midst of
a ‘legitimacy crisis,’ there is an emerging consensus in the literature that greater consistency in
investment treaty arbitration would be desirable.”).
113 . Stephen E. Blythe, The Advantages of Investor-State Arbitration As A Dispute
Resolution Mechanism in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 47 INT’L LAW. 273, 274 (2013).
114. Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93
CAL. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2005).
115. Julian Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations: New
Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71, 126 (2000).
116. MOUYAL, supra note 23, at 18.
117. Brower & Schill, supra note 68, at 497 (“Investment treaties can affect the way host
states govern, legislate, and adjudicate and can have a profound impact on local populations.”).
118. WANG, supra note 36, at 4.
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constricting119 as our world moves more towards what Professor Philip
Bobbitt calls the “market-state.”120
As described above, international investment arbitration is
distinct from the rest of international arbitration in the aspect that
investment arbitration focuses significantly on public international
law.121 The nature of an investment arbitral dispute is different than a
private commercial arbitration, as the interests in investment disputes
expand beyond the parties,122 including the effect of the award could
force a state to alter its regulatory actions.123 Essentially, arbitrators
interpret and apply public law to award damages as a remedy for
investors based on the assessment of sovereign acts of a state under a
broad standard of review.124 This far-reaching power of arbitrators in
investment disputes can “undermine[ ] basic hallmarks of judicial
accountability, openness, and independence.” 125 Because of this
perceived threat to the sovereignty of nation-states, the overall
legitimacy of international arbitral system can be challenged, and states
may become protectionist by refusing to consent to investment
arbitration at all. Professor José Alvarez identified several issues
related to the legitimacy of the investment regime, and summarized his
idea into this: “the international investment regime is the enemy of the
state.”126
But international tribunals, including investment arbitration and
the World Investment Court proposed here, can be legitimate, and the
reason for this proposal for a World Investment Court is founded on an
119. John Linarelli, How Trade Law Changed: Why It Should Change Again, 65 MERCER
L. REV. 621, 622 (2014) (“While the most sophisticated and developed of these institutions is
still at the level of the state, the sovereignty of states is becoming a quaint and outdated idea.”).
120 . PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT: THE WARS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 4 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 2008) (defining a “market-state” as “[t]he emerging
constitutional order that promises to maximize the opportunity of its people, tending to privatize
many state activities and making representative government more responsible to consumers”).
121. Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Emerging Civilization of Investment Arbitration, 113
PENN ST. L. REV. 1269, 1294 (2009).
122. Anton K. Schnyder & Stefanie Pfisterer, Features of Trade Law Adjudication and
Their Impact on the Development of Legal Concepts and Precedents, in ESTABLISHING
JUDICIAL AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 188, 209 (Joanna Jemielniak et al.
eds., 2016).
123. Dohyun Kim, Note, The Annulment Committee’s Role in Multiplying Inconsistency
in ICSID Arbitration: The Need to Move Away from an Annulment-Based System, 86 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 242, 253 (2011).
124. VAN HARTEN, supra note 13, at 5.
125. Id.
126. José E. Alvarez & Gustavo Topalian, The Paradoxical Argentina Cases, 6 WORLD
ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 491, 492 (2012).
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enhanced legitimacy claim. Because of the public-private law
distinction, consistency plays a significant role in the legitimacy of the
supranational institution. 127 The fragmentation 128 of international
investment laws—particularly the proliferation of treaties and ad hoc
tribunals—seems to threaten unity and coherence in international
law,129 and has even been described as one of the “‘most worrying of
modernity’s concerns’ for international lawyers.”130
In our “new international economic order,” the ultimate goal is to
enhance human welfare through the benefits of international relations,
particularly wealth.131 Financial stability and international investment
law are global public goods specifically because investment law guides
FDI policies, promotes stability, and protects the benefits of both
investors and states. 132 If we accept Professor Ronald Dworkin’s
premise that each state has a general obligation to improve its own
legitimacy and promote the status and wealth of their citizens, then
because of the increasing growth and importance of FDI in this
globalizing world, states have a duty to improve the overall
international investment system. 133 The legitimacy of states is then
connected to the improvement of international law, including FDI.
Because of the public law nature of foreign investment, FDI law is a
public good,134 and even the World Bank provided in its Guidelines on
the Treatment of FDI, that a “greater flow of foreign direct investment
brings substantial benefits to bear on the world economy and on the

127. Susan D. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights Under Investment
Treaties: Do Investment Treaties Have A Bright Future, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 47,
77, n.119 (2005).
128. Because there is no vertical hierarchy in international investment law, different
investment systems currently exist on an equal plane, and while influential to each other, none
can claim control based on hierarchy. See RONNIE R. F. YEARWOOD, THE INTERACTION
BETWEEN WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION (WTO) LAW AND EXTERNAL INTERNATIONAL LAW:
THE CONSTRAINED OPENNESS OF WTO LAW (A PROLOGUE TO A THEORY) 30 (2012)
(“Fragmentation implies that faced with two reasons or norms to apply to a single decision,
neither reason nor norm can claim ‘hierarchical superiority.’”).
129 . NICO KRISCH, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PLURALIST STRUCTURE OF
POSTNATIONAL LAW 199 (2012).
130. YEARWOOD, supra note 128, at 31 (citation omitted).
131. Barnali Choudhury, International Investment Law As A Global Public Good, 17
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 481, 483 (2013).
132. Id. at 484.
133. Ronald Dworkin, A New Philosophy for International Law, 41 PHIL. & PUBLIC AFF.
1, 17 (2013).
134. Choudhury, supra note 131, at 499.
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economies of developing countries in particular.”135 Therefore, if the
improvement of international investment law can be done more
effectively and efficiently through a supranational investment court,
then states should contribute to creating this World Investment
Court.136 In fact, there has been an increasing resistance to how BITs
have been interpreted by ad hoc arbitrators far beyond the original
meaning, a function which has caused some challenges to the current
investment arbitral system.137
An international court is legitimate when its authority is perceived
as just, possessing some “quality that leads people (or states) to accept
[its] authority . . . because of a general sense that the authority is
justified.”138 Therefore, an international court is legitimate when it is
“(1) fair and unbiased, (2) interpreting and applying norms consistent
with what states believe the law is or should be, and (3) transparent and
imbued with democratic norms.” 139 Legitimacy is connected to
compliance or obedience, 140 and thus, the international law needs
order, as order is essential to a just and stable global society. 141 A
World Investment Court would satisfy these legitimacy principles
because it would promote consistent awards and a predictable legal
framework for international investment law. With a consistent and
coherent body of investment law, states would be more willing to
accept the Court’s legitimacy and consent to and comply with its “just”
authority.

135. Daniil E. Fedorchuk, Acceding to the WTO: Advantages for Foreign Investors in the
Ukrainian Market, 15 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1, 12 (2002).
136 . For a detailed reply to Dworkin’s international theory, see generally, Adam S.
Chilton, A Reply to Dworkin’s New Theory of International Law, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE
105 (2013).
137. Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, Evolution or Revolution in International Investment
Arbitration? The Descent into Normlessness, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND
ARBITRATION 631, 632 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011).
138. Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge
for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 596, 600 (1999). See also Nienke
Grossman, Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies, 41 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV.
107, 115 (2009) (proposing that “a “legitimate” international adjudicative body is one whose
authority is perceived as justified.”).
139. Grossman, supra note 138, at 115.
140. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 24 (1990)
(concluding “legitimacy is a property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a
pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that
the rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted
principles of right process.”).
141. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (6th ed. 2008).
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Three principles that support an international court’s legitimacy
are implicated here: (1) transparency and accountability, (2)
impartiality, and (3) consistency or predictability, and many scholars
believe investment arbitration suffers in each principles. 142 As
discussed in this Part, these legitimacy challenges arise in each of these
principles and predominantly lean in favor of establishing a World
Investment Court.
B. Transparency and Accountability
One continuing issue with the current investment arbitral system
is that proceedings and awards are often confidential.143 For example,
UNCITRAL Rules require the consent of all the parties before an award
or proceeding is made public,144 and ICSID proceedings are likewise
private. 145 However, ICSID publishes the arbitral awards on its
website,146 and many non-ICSID investment arbitral awards come to
public view when the award is either challenged in domestic courts or
when the state has to account for payment of an arbitral award.147 But
the remaining problem is that the investment arbitral proceedings are
private, even though most investment disputes are effectively public
disputes. 148 Investment arbitration deals with international public
law—judging the regulatory actions of a sovereign state—and an
award against a state would affect that state’s citizens as well;
therefore, this issue is significantly more pertinent to third parties than
in the context of commercial arbitration.149 Private proceedings and ad
hoc awards give limited public understanding of the arbitral procedures
142. Julia Hueckel, Comment, Rebalancing Legitimacy and Sovereignty in International
Investment Agreements, 61 EMORY L.J. 601, 606 (2012)
143. Stephanie Bijlmakers, Effects of Foreign Direct Investment Arbitration on a State’s
Regulatory Autonomy Involving the Public Interest, 23 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 245, 259 (2012).
144. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Arbitration Rules, art. 34(5)
(2010).
145 . Leon Trakman, The ICSID and Investor-State Arbitration, in REGIONALISM IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 270 (Leon Trakman & Nicola Ranieri eds., 2013).
146. Advanced Search, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/Advanced
Search.aspx [https://perma.cc/4HDP-L9NJ] (last visited Oct. 21, 2017).
147. Nigel Blackaby, Investment Arbitration and Commercial Arbitration (or the Tale of
the Dolphin and the Shark), in PERVASIVE PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 217,
226 (Loukas A. Mistelis & Julian D.M. Lew, eds., 2006).
148. SURYA P. SUBEDI, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: RECONCILING POLICY AND
PRINCIPLE 171 (2d ed. 2012).
149. James D. Fry & Odysseas G. Repousis, Towards A New World for Investor-State
Arbitration Through Transparency, 48 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 795, 804-06 (2016).
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and reasoning, and the potential public impact has increased this
concern.150 A state is accountable to its people, and the legality of a
state’s regulatory actions is a matter of public concern that should not
be kept confidential.151 Additionally, public scrutiny would keep the
appearance of accountability and impartiality on the part of the
arbitrators, thereby removing some of the concern that arbitrators are
generally pro-investor. As a symbol, openness is important as it
demonstrates that neither the investor nor the state has something to
hide.152
A World Investment Court would resolve these transparency
concerns, as a centralized investment court would be open in its
proceedings to third parties and would publish its decisions and
reasoning to the public. While confidentiality in commercial arbitral
proceedings often has advantages, it is significantly less beneficial in
investment arbitration when an award would affect an entire state and
its people. Public proceedings and awards would additionally provide
states with a general sense of the consequences for their future
regulatory actions, as states could conform future actions to outcomes
in decisions by the court in similar disputes.
C. Tribunal Independence
The independence of arbitrators is often a criticism many scholars
focus on when discussing the problems of international arbitration.153
But arbitrator integrity and impartiality in investment disputes is both
necessary and possible.154 In arbitration, independence generally refers
to a lack of improper connections, while impartiality refers to a lack of
prejudgment, and “an arbitrator in international disputes must be both
independent and impartial.”155 In the context of investment arbitration,
because states usually have given a broad and general consent to

150. Leon E. Trakman, The ICSID Under Siege, 45 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 603, 621-22
(2012).
151. VAN HARTEN, supra note 13, at 159.
152. Jack J. Coe, Jr., Transparency in the Resolution of Investor-State Disputes - Adoption,
Adaption, and NAFTA Leadership, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1339, 1361 (2006).
153 . See Gus Van Harten, Working Paper No. 22/08: A Case for an International
Investment Court 2 (SOC’Y INT’L ECON. L. 2008).
154. William W. Park, Arbitrator Integrity: The Transient and the Permanent, 46 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 629, 633-34 (2009).
155. Id. at 635-36.
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arbitrate, arbitrator integrity is increasingly necessary as awards
substantially impact vital state interests.156
The rapid growth of investment arbitration has led to increased
criticism for an alleged lack of arbitrator impartiality or
independence.157 Some scholars put forth this idea that arbitrators tend
to favor investors in their awards, for the very reason that arbitrators
only receive appointments when investors bring disputes, and investors
will only initiate disputes if arbitrators are willing to award damages to
investors. 158 While plausible on its face, there is significant trouble
accepting the argument that arbitrators are actually biased towards
investors, and this assertion seems less persuasive when viewing
counters to it. Here, my analysis in this Article, like several other
scholars’, disagrees with Van Harten in investment arbitration
analysis. 159 Particularly, investors will generally only bring claims
before a tribunal if there is a significant chance of prevailing, as one
has to balance the cost of arbitrating this dispute versus the likely
outcome. This could account for many cases resolving in favor of the
investor—if empirically cases actually did—as there must be a strong
underlying reason for the dispute. In addition to general concerns,
investors do not usually bring a suit against a state without due
consideration, as states do not easily accept the result of an arbitral
tribunal when that tribunal reviews the actions of state.160
Investment arbitrations usually arise in extreme situations, and
little correlation has been found that when investor protections
increase, so do investment-disputes. 161 There is also little empirical
evidence to support the assertion that investment arbitrators lack
impartiality or independence.162 However, some evidence points to the
opposite, in that investors have won fewer investment arbitrations than
156. Id. at 656.
157. MOUYAL, supra note 23, at 16.
158. See, e.g., VAN HARTEN, supra note 13, at 5-6, 173.
159. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 18, at 915.
160. Ian A. Laird, NAFTA Chapter 11 Meets Chicken Little, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 223, 22829 (2001).
161. Daniel S. Meyers, In Defense of the International Treaty Arbitration System, 31
HOUS. J. INT’L L. 47, 56 (2008).
162. Daphna Kapeliuk, The Repeat Appointment Factor: Exploring Decision Patterns of
Elite Investment Arbitrators, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 47, 90 (2010) (concluding that “the research
results still display no tendency by any group of arbitrators to grant compromise awards or to
rule in favor of investors”). Cf. SUBEDI, supra note 31, at 151 (“The jurisprudence of
international investment courts and tribunals has expanded the scope and meaning of various
principles of investment law in as pro-investment a manner as possible.”).
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states. 163 There is even evidence that some investment tribunals are
becoming more deferential to states’ regulatory actions. 164
Furthermore, a valuable professional reputation of an arbitrator is
essential to the arbitrator being appointed,165 and a biased reputation
for either party will not increase the number of appointments.166
If arbitrators largely favored investors, states would have little
incentive to negotiate BITs with arbitration as the dispute
mechanism167 or states would simply denounce the investment arbitral
system, as Bolivia and Ecuador recently did.168 In fact, Pakistan has
stated they will no longer contain investment arbitration provisions in
its BITs, and both South Africa and Indonesia have terminated existing
BITs that contained investment arbitration provisions. 169 Generally,
most scholars disagree with the assertion that arbitrators are proinvestor, 170 and this assertion seems less than likely. Some scholars
have even called this argument “myopic,” primarily because this view
disregards the procedures and mechanisms already within the arbitral
system to ensure impartiality.171
163 . See Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 49 (2007) (providing that, before 2007, investors had won 38.5%
of investment arbitrations while governments had prevailed 57.7% of the time); JÜRGEN KURTZ,
THE WTO AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: CONVERGING SYSTEMS 246 n.81 (2016)
(citing 2014 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD] report where
31% of investment disputes were won by investors while 43% of investment disputes were won
by states with 26% settled).
164. See, e.g., Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on Jurisdiction
and Liability, ¶ 505 (Jan. 14, 2010) (referring to the “high measure of deference that
international law generally extends to the right of domestic authorities to regulate matters within
their own borders,” especially in cases when “the purpose of the legislation affects deeply felt
cultural or linguistic traits of the community”); Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. US, ICSID, Award, ¶ 805
(June 8, 2009) (concluding that it would invalidate a state’s measure only if there was a
“manifest lack of reasons for the legislation”).
165. Valentina Vadi, Global Cultural Governance by Investment Arbitral Tribunals: The
Making of A Lex Administrativa Culturalis, 33 B.U. INT’L L.J. 457, 485 (2015).
166. Park, supra note 154, at 658.
167. See Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals,
93 CAL. L. REV. 1, 21 (2005).
168. DENUNCIATION OF THE ICSID CONVENTION AND BITS: IMPACT ON INVESTORSTATE CLAIMS, UNCTAD (2010), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaeia20106_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CQD9-LGTY] (last visited Oct. 21, 2017).
169 . Michael Nolan, Challenges to the Credibility of the Investor-State Arbitration
System, 5 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 429, 434-35 (2016).
170. See, e.g., Brower & Schill, supra note 68, at 476 (“We argue that investment treaties
and investment-treaty arbitration do not unilaterally favor investors’ interests over competing
public policy choices and do not institutionalize a pro-investor bias.”).
171. Brower & Schill, supra note 68, at 491.
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However, while there are several persuasive arguments that there
is no reason to believe arbitrators lack independence or impartiality in
investment arbitration, some believe it is “the mere appearance” of a
conflict of interest or pro-investor bias that invites criticism of the
current investment system.172 One such concern is that arbitrators are
often also lawyers, and can represent a party in one investment dispute
while serving as an arbitrator in a different investment dispute. This
concerns many critics, including US Senator Elizabeth Warren, who
has asserted that investment dispute resolution “could lead to gigantic
fines, but it wouldn’t employ independent judges. Instead, highly paid
corporate lawyers would go back and forth between representing
corporations one day and sitting in judgment the next.”173 Additionally,
recent high-profile challenges to arbitrator appointments have
increased concern, 174 and over 200 economists and law professors
signed a letter opposing the inclusion of investor-state dispute
resolution in future international investment agreements.175
Even if this perception is valid, the institution of a World
Investment Court would solve this issue and increase the impartiality
of the panel as the judges comprising the panel would simply be paid a
salary regardless of the number of cases they heard, giving them little
incentive to be pro-investor. Additionally, in this proposal, states would
appoint these justices, and because states have conflicting interests—
need for protection from investment disputes and the need to protect
their own investors in foreign states—this would require states to
appoint fair and impartial judges rather than judges favoring either
side.176 While the claim that arbitrators are partial to investors is not
overly convincing, a panel of duly-appointed judges, ones indifferent
172. Michael D. Goldhaber, The Rise of Arbitral Power over Domestic Courts, 1 STAN. J.
COMPLEX LITIG. 373, 407 (2013). See also Van Harten, supra note 153, at 2.
173. Elizabeth Warren, The Trans-Pacific Partnership clause everyone should oppose,
WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kill-the-disputesettlement-language-in-the-trans-pacific-partnership/2015/02/25/ec7705a2-bd1e-11e4-b274e5209a3bc9a9_story.html?utm_term=.43d3250b0345
[https://perma.cc/3Y7M-TRD8]
(archived Oct. 21, 2017).
174. Nolan, supra note 169, at 440-41.
175. Luis Miguel Velarde Saffer & Amir Ardelan Farhadi, ISDS In The TPP: Is The
Recent Uproar In The US Merited? – Part I, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Nov. 4, 2016),
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/11/04/isds-in-the-tpp-is-the-recent-uproar-in-the-usmerited-part-i/ [https://perma.cc/N2TG-6YRX] (archived Oct. 21, 2017).
176. See Posner & Yoo, supra note 167, at 7 (“Indeed, states will be reluctant to use
international tribunals unless they have control over the judges. On our view, independence
prevents international tribunals from being effective.”).
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to how many cases they handle, would remove these critiques from the
debate, and this perception of partiality—valid or not—would be
extinguished. Referring back to the legitimacy principles above, to
enhance an international court’s legitimacy, the judges must establish
a reputation for neutrality and objectivity,177 and a World Investment
Court would satisfy these principles.
D. Inconsistent and Incoherent Interpretations of Investment Law
Inconsistent decisions by arbitral tribunals threaten the legitimacy
of investment arbitration.178 The necessity of consistent and coherent
decisions is arguably the most persuasive critique of international
investment arbitration and the primary reason for instituting a World
Investment Court. Inconsistency provides a foundation for allegations
of unfairness, in addition to creating a lack of predictability and
reliability in the investment arbitral system. 179 With the increase of
investment disputes, there has been an increase of inconsistent arbitral
decisions, where one tribunal interprets a provision or provides a
judgment that conflicts with another tribunal’s decision. 180 When
inconsistent decisions arise, FDI is again seen as risky, as unpredictable
decisions can bring high costs to both investors and states. 181
Investment treaties were created to promote FDI by providing
protection to foreign investment and reducing risk;182 but inconsistent
177. Georgios Dimitropoulos, Constructing the Independence of International Investment
Arbitrators: Past, Present and Future, 36 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 371, 387 (2016); Susan D.
Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1586 (2005).
178. William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public Law
Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 283, 299
(2010).
179. Franck, supra note 127, at 63.
180. Compare Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, ¶ 154 (May 29, 2003) (defining requirement of “fair and equitable
treatment” under NAFTA article 1105 as requiring reasonable expectations of a foreign investor
be satisfied), with S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, UNCITRAL Arbitration, First Partial Award, ¶
263 (Nov. 13, 2000), http://www.uncitral.org/res/transparency-registry/registry/data/can/s_d__
myers_inc_html/myers-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RNF-WZ8D] (archived Oct. 21, 2017)
(defining the same requirement as necessitating only that a foreign investment not be treated
unjustly or arbitrarily).
181. Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial Litigation, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 35 (2008).
182. Pascal Lamy, Opening Remarks at the WTO Nongovernmental Organization
Symposium: The WTO New Round: Perspectives for Hamburg and Europe, Speech/01/333
(July 6, 2001), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-01-333_en.htm [https://perma.cc/
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decisions prevent this purpose from effectuating, making investment
treaties less protective of foreign investment, and provide no direction
for states to conform regulatory actions in the future.183
There are several situations in which inconsistent decisions and
interpretations can arise in international investment arbitration,
including: (1) disputes involving the same facts, parties, and similar
investment rights; (2) disputes involving similar situations and similar
investment rights; (3) disputes involving different parties, different
situations, but the same investment rights, 184 and (4) explicit
disagreements with a prior arbitral award.
The first situation can be shown in the well-known Lauder
arbitrations, where two arbitral tribunals, one in Stockholm and one in
London, came to conflicting decisions on the identical dispute. On the
same set of facts, Lauder initiated an arbitration proceeding against the
Czech Republic under the US-Czech Republic BIT185 while Lauder’s
investment intermediary initiated an arbitration under the NetherlandsCzech Republic BIT.186 While the expropriation standards under both
BITs were functionally identical, the London tribunal held the
investment was not expropriated, 187 while the Stockholm tribunal
concluded the investment was expropriated, and ordered the Czech
Republic to pay almost US$270 million.188
Another prominent example of inconsistent awards is found in
five cases filed by American companies under the Argentina-US
BIT. 189 The cases surrounded the same governmental action—the
8PXW-Z9KD] (archived Oct. 21, 2017) (providing that “by increasing the predictability for
potential investors, [this would] lead to more investment with all the benefits it can bring”).
183. Johanna Kalb, Creating an ICSID Appellate Body, 10 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN
AFF. 179, 198 (2005).
184. Franck, supra note 56, at 1545-46.
185. See generally Ronald S. Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Final
Award (Sept. 3, 2001).
186. See generally CME v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Partial Award
(Sept. 13, 2001), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0178.pdf [https://
perma.cc/GAG7-G73V] (archived Oct. 21, 2017).
187. Lauder v. Czech Republic, Final Award, supra note 185, ¶ 201.
188. CME v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, supra note 186, ¶ 624.
189. See Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award (Sept.
5, 2008) [hereinafter CCS Award]; Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/16, Award (Sept. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Sempra Award]; Enron Corp. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award (May 22, 2007) [hereinafter Enron Award];
LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability
(Oct. 3, 2006) [hereinafter LG&E Liability Decision]; CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award (May 12, 2005) [hereinafter CMS Award].
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removal of stabilization measures during an economic crisis in
Argentina—and Argentina argued that its actions satisfied the necessity
defense under customary international law and the emergency clause
under the Argentina-US BIT. 190 Three of the tribunals determined
Argentina did not satisfy either defense, 191 but the remaining two
tribunals concluded Argentina did satisfy the emergency defense
provided in the BIT.192 But even the two tribunals who held in favor of
Argentina applied the emergency defense differently.193
Another example of a group of inconsistent decisions begins with
Maffenzini v. Kingdom of Spain. 194 There, an Argentine national
brought a request for arbitration against Spain under the ArgentinaSpain BIT, but the BIT required the investor to submit the claim to the
Spanish domestic courts and allow eighteen months before initiating
arbitration.195 However, the investor claimed the most-favored nation
clause in the Argentina-Spain BIT allowed the use of the favorable
treatment in the Spain-Chile BIT, which only required a six-month
waiting period before arbitration could be initiated. 196 The tribunal
agreed with the investor, concluding the most-favored nation clause
could extend to procedural matters such as the dispute resolution
mechanism, and held the tribunal had jurisdiction over the claim.197
Some have agreed that this is a defensible reading of the most-favored
nation obligation in that the underlying purpose of the clause is to
prevent states from discriminating against and between foreign
investors.198
However, in Salini Constutorri S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v.
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,199 two companies initiated arbitration
190. Sempra Award, supra note 189, ¶ 388; Enron Award, supra note 189, ¶¶ 313, 321,
339; CMS Award, supra note 189, ¶ 331.
191. Sempra Award, supra note 189, ¶ 388; Enron Award, supra note 189, ¶¶ 313, 321,
339; CMS Award, supra note 189, ¶ 331.
192. CCS Award, supra note 189, ¶¶ 219-22, 266; LG&E Liability Decision, supra note
189, ¶¶ 257-63.
193. Irene M. Ten Cate, International Arbitration and the Ends of Appellate Review, 44
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1109, 1175 (2012).
194. Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 1 (Jan.
25, 2000).
195. See id. ¶ 19 (citing Article X.3 of the Argentina-Spain BIT).
196. Id. ¶¶ 38-39.
197. Id. ¶¶ 64, 99.
198. Jürgen Kurtz, The MFN Standard and Foreign Investment: An Uneasy Fit, 5 J.
WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 861, 861-86 (2004).
199. Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, Decision on Jurisdiction (Nov. 29, 2004),
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under the Italy-Jordan BIT, but in trying to avoid less desirable
provisions, the companies attempted to invoke the most-favored nation
clause to rely on the dispute resolution provisions in the Jordan-US and
Jordan-UK BITs. 200 In doing so, the companies argued the mostfavored nation clause should apply to procedural provisions, citing the
prior arbitral decision in Maffenzini.201 But the tribunal determined the
companies could not rely on the most-favored nation provision to
invoke the dispute resolution mechanisms in other BITs, and dismissed
the case for lack of jurisdiction.202 The arbitral tribunal in Plama v.
Bulgaria similarly determined that without an express confirmation in
the investment treaty, a most-favored nation clause does not
incorporate the dispute resolution mechanism of another investment
treaty.203
Tribunals can come to different conclusions even when
interpreting the same provision. For example, S.D. Myers v. Canada204
and Metalclad v. United Mexican States 205 were both cases under
NAFTA, where the tribunals applied the “fair and equitable treatment”
clause of the treaty inconsistently. In Metalclad, the tribunal
determined the scope of the clause provided companies with a right that
existed independent of the minimum standards of customary
international law.206 Similarly, the tribunal in S.D. Myers held that for
the provision to be violated “an investor has been treated in such an
unjust or arbitrary manner that the treatment rises to the level that is
unacceptable from the international perspective,”207 and therefore, the
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/02/13
[https://perma.cc/T4DY-Z48D] (archived Oct. 21, 2017).
200. Id. ¶¶ 21, 102.
201. Id. ¶¶ 36, 102.
202. Id. ¶ 119.
203. See Plama Consortium, Ltd. v. Republic of Bulg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24,
Decision on Jurisdiction (Feb. 8, 2005), ¶¶ 198, 227 (citing Maffezini and attempting to
distinguish the decision).
204. S.D. Myers, Inc., Partial Award, supra note 180.
205. Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award (Aug. 30, 2000),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB(AF)/97/1
[https://perma.cc/F2M6-NJR8] (archived Oct. 21, 2017).
206. Id. ¶ 103 (concluding that “[e]xpropriation under NAFTA includes not only open,
deliberate and acknowledged takings of property, such as outright seizure or formal or obligatory
transfer of title in favour of the host State, but also covert or incidental interference with the use
of property which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the
use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to the
obvious benefit of the host State”).
207. S.D. Myers, Inc., First Partial Award supra note 108 ¶ 263.
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provision was independent on customary international law. 208
However, the tribunal in Methanex v. United States held that the fair
and equitable treatment treaty standard did not integrate protections
beyond customary law and that “non-discrimination” was not part of
that international standard.209
Even further confusing this line of decisions, the tribunal in Genin
v. Estonia held that the “fair and equitable treatment” standard only
proscribed a willful neglect of duty that was below international
standards or had subjective bad faith.210 However, the tribunal in Pope
& Talbot, Inc. v. Canada determined that provision imposed a higher
standard of fairness.211 Yet another tribunal interpreted the clause to
protect legitimate investor expectations as well.212 In fact, Metalclad
still remains outlier due to its broad expropriation standard.213
While generally considered rare, 214 explicit disagreements
between tribunals prevent a fully coherent body of investment law. For
example, the tribunals in SGS v. Pakistan215 and SGS Philippines216
were presented with the same question: whether an ICSID tribunal has
jurisdiction over an investor’s breach of contract claim even when there
is an exclusive forum-selection clause.217 The two tribunals interpreted
the construction of the umbrella clauses differently: SGS v. Pakistan
208. Christian J. Tams, Is There a Need for an ICSID Appellate Structure?, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES 223 (R.
Hofmann & Christian J. Tams eds., 2007).
209 . Methanex v. United States, ¶¶ 16, 25-26, UNCITRAL, Award (Aug. 3, 2005)
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0529.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/6TZH-MRN9] (archived Oct. 21, 2017).
210. Genin v. Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, Award, ¶ 367 (June 25, 2001).
211. Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, UNCITRAL ¶¶ 110-17 (Apr. 10, 2001)
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0678.pdf [https://perma.cc/GNF3
-8GB2] (archived Oct. 21, 2017).
212. Azurix Corp. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award on the Merits, ¶ 372 (July
12, 2006) https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0061.pdf [https://perma
.cc/XC5M-B4UU] (archived Oct. 21, 2017).
213. Steven R. Ratner, Regulatory Takings in Institutional Context: Beyond the Fear of
Fragmented International Law, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 475, 512 (2008).
214. SCHILL, supra note 1, at 342-43. For a more detailed analysis of inconsistent awards,
see, e.g., Franck, supra note 56, at 1558-1582.
215. SGS Sociéte Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13,
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 163-74 (Aug. 6, 2003).
216 . SGS Sociéte Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Philippines, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/6, Decision on Jurisdiction, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 71-88, (Jan. 29, 2004),
http://www.italaw.com/documents/SGSvPhil-final_001.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C3NN-FQT9]
(archived Oct. 21, 2017).
217. Matthew Wendlandt, SGS v. Philippines and the Role of ICSI Tribunals in InvestorState Contract Disputes, 43 TEX. INT’L L.J. 523, 525 (2008).
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followed a restrictive approach where the foreign investor could only
seek arbitration for breaches of contract resulting from foreign acts,218
while SGS v. Philippines followed a broader interpretation, allowing
foreign investors to use arbitration for relief for any breach of contract
with the state, thereby going beyond customary international law.219
However, the tribunal in SGS v. Philippines (which was subsequent to
the decision in SGS v. Pakistan) did not try to distinguish or avoid
inconsistency with the prior tribunal’s conflicting interpretation, but
rather explicitly disagreed with the decision in SGS v. Pakistan.220 This
divergence has only grown more widespread, as several later tribunals
followed the decision in SGS v. Philippines,221 and others followed the
decision in SGS v. Pakistan.222 In fact, referring back to the Metalclad
and S.D. Myers, Inc. decisions above, tribunals following these awards
have explicitly disregarded their reasoning, interpreting the “fair and
equitable treatment” clause to constitute obligations only to the extent
of customary international law, and not further.223
E. Necessity of Consistent and Coherent Interpretations of IIAs
These are just a few examples of the inconsistencies of investment
arbitration, both in substantive and procedural interpretations of
investment agreements. 224 While arbitrators are not bound by the
decisions of other tribunals or even required to recognize prior awards,
many arbitrators respect previous decisions and often integrate the
prior award’s reasoning into their own judgments.225 Both parties and
218. SGS v. Pakistan, supra note 215.
219. SGS v. Philippines, supra note 216.
220. Id. ¶¶ 97, 119-26.
221. CMS Gas Transmission v. Arg, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶¶ 300-03 (May
12, 2005); Noble Ventures, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, ¶ 52 (Oct. 12, 2005); Fedax
N.V. v. Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, ¶ 29 (Mar. 9, 1998).
222. See e.g., Pan American Energy LLC and BP Argentina Exploration Company v. Arg.,
entine, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/13, ¶ 110 (July 27, 2006).
223. The Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award, ¶ 128
(June 26, 2003) (“To the extent, if at all, that NAFTA Tribunals in Metalclad Corp v. United
Mexican States ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (Aug 30, 2000), S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government
of Canada (Nov 13, 2000) and Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Award on the Merits, Phase 2,
(Apr 10, 2001) may have expressed contrary views, those views must be disregarded.”).
224. See Franck, supra note 56, at 1545 (discussing three typical scenarios of inconsistent
decisions).
225. W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward A Theory of Precedent in Arbitration, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1895, 1940 n.216 (2010). See also Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A.
v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, Decision on Jurisdiction ¶ 36
(Nov. 29, 2004), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C218/
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arbitrators frequently cite to prior decisions for guidance or support.226
Yet it is important to note that citation of a prior investment award does
not necessarily mean influence,227 and tribunals keep away from any
strict principle of stare decisis to allow flexibility in their decisions.228
Some scholars argue that arbitrators in investor-state disputes should
not adopt precedent solely because it came first, as this would impose
a “decisional burden” on arbitrators, and these scholars would rather
have arbitrators find the “right” rule rather than a consistent one.229
This argument is predicated on the dynamic nature of international
investment law and the “fragmented” system of BITs. 230 But this
current system, where two awards on the same set of facts and under
similar BITs can create two separate outcomes such as in the Lauder
arbitrations, “shocks the sense of rule of law or fairness.”231
Consistent and coherent interpretation is essential to
legitimacy,232 and incoherent rules of law have created a challenge to
the legitimacy of investment arbitration. One arbitral tribunal’s
interpretation of a procedural or substantive right or the scope of
“investment” in a BIT has a direct impact on subsequent arbitrations,
not only under the same BIT but under other investment treaties with
similar language or provisions.233 Consistency requires that a rule be
applied uniformly in every similar or applicable situation,234 a principle
the WTO Appellate Body has embraced. 235 Similarly, coherence

DC635_En.pdf [https://perma.cc/TS7N-6A42] (archived Oct. 21, 2017) (citing Maffezini v.
Spain as “ICSID precedent”).
226. WANG, supra note 36, at 28.
227. Kyla Tienhaara & Todd Tucker, Regulating Foreign Investment: Methanex Revisited,
in ALTERNATIVE VISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note
17, at 255, 273 (providing that the award in Methanex v. United States had been widely cited in
32 of the 101 publicly-available investment awards, yet had gained little traction in subsequent
decisions).
228. Gilbert Guillaume, The Use of Precedent by International Judges and Arbitrators, 2
J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 5, 14 (2011).
229 . Irene M. Ten Cate, The Costs of Consistency: Precedent in Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 418, 422 (2013).
230. Id. at 422
231. Michael .D. Goldhaber, Wanted: A World Investment Court, AM. LAW. (2004).
232. MOUYAL, supra note 23, at 57.
233. See Todd Weiler, NAFTA Article 1105 and the Principles of International Economic
Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 35 (2003).
234. THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 38
(1995).
235. Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless
Steel from Mexico, ¶ 160, WT/DS344/AB/R (adopted April 30, 2008) (concluding that “absent
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relates to the principle that the system should make sense as a whole,
and the principle of coherence is integral to the order of international
law because coherence forms a well-organized structure. 236 But
different interpretations of essentially identical provisions in similar or
the same BIT—such as the scope of most-favored nation provisions
discussed above—create a lack of coherence and threaten the
legitimacy of the investment dispute system. 237 However, a central
World Investment Court would prevent multiple proceedings where
investors initiate arbitrations under different BITs hoping to win under
at least one. Looking to the Lauder arbitrations, this multiplicity
problem leads to inconsistent decisions on the same set of facts and
denigrates the legitimacy of the system. 238 Due to the public law
underpinnings of international investment, consistency should be
pursued.239
Some have suggested that “inconsistency” actually enhances
predictability and allows flexibility in the arbitral system when
needed.240 This inconsistency, it is argued, can identify flaws in the
system and allow for improvements leading to positive changes,
providing a “more considered jurisprudence,”241 an assertion similar to
the “right decision” argument. While the flexibility argument may
pertain to commercial arbitration where consistent rules are not
necessary because disputes are fact-driven, based on contract
interpretation, and focused only on the isolated dispute between the
parties, 242 the argument does not apply equally to international
investment arbitration, primarily because disputes are focused on
regulatory actions of a state. 243 Private commercial arbitration is solely
between the parties, while the investment agreements allow the states
to be subject to any future investor-state dispute, and the treaty may be
cogent reasons, an adjudicatory body will resolve the same legal question in the same way in a
subsequent case”).
236. MOUYAL, supra note 23, at 2.
237. Gabriel Egli, Don’t Get Bit: Addressing ICSID’s Inconsistent Application of MostFavoured-Nation Clauses to Dispute Resolution Provisions, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 1045, 1079
(2007).
238. See supra section IV(d)(i).
239. KURTZ, supra note 163, at 247.
240. Franck, supra note 127, at 68.
241. Id.
242. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse? 23
ARB. INT’L 357, 376 (2007).
243. W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward A Theory of Precedent in Arbitration, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1895, 1909 (2010).
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the subject to many investment arbitrations, such as the Argentina-US
BIT after its economic crisis.244
Additionally, as described above, most BITs have the same or
substantially similar language and the international system of BITs are
not as fragmented as some may believe. 245 This convergence in
language and protection is influencing a multilateralization of
investment agreements. 246 A system of precedent with an appellate
body, like the one suggested in this Article, would be able to promote
consistency; yet at the same time, precedent can be overturned, which
can still allow for the “right” decision.247 Even domestic courts do not
simply apply strict stare decisis to their cases, but can reverse their
earlier rulings through careful and clear reasoning.248 This needs to be
done at the international level, as the legitimacy of the investment

244. See generally Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award (Sept. 5,
2008); Sempra Energy Int’l v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award (Sept. 28, 2007); Enron
Corp. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award (May 22, 2007); LG&E Energy Corp. v. Arg.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability (Oct. 3, 2006); CMS Gas Transmission Co.
v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award (May 12, 2005).
245. Stephen W. Schill, The Jurisprudence of Investment Treaty Tribunals: Between
Public Good and Common Concern, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COMMON CONCERNS 9, 9 (Tulio Treves et. al eds., 2014).
246. Stephan W. Schill, Multilateralizing Investment Treaties Through Most-FavoredNation Clauses, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 496, 566 (2009).
247. Some scholars argue there already is a form of de facto precedent in the current
investment arbitral system. See, e.g., SCHILL, supra note 1, at 321-61; Tai-Heng Cheng,
Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1014, 1016
(2006); Jan Paulsson, International Arbitration and the Generation of Legal Norms,
TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 12 (2006) (“That a special jurisprudence is developing from the
leading awards in the domain of investment arbitration can only be denied by those determined
to close their eyes.”); Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Emerging Civilization of Investment
Arbitration, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1269, 1286-94 (“Notwithstanding the general rule in public
international law that case law has no precedential value, arbitral awards are increasingly used
as persuasive authority both by advocates and by tribunals.”).
However, as Professor Schill notes that with the absence of a principle of stare decisis,
there is the potentiality for inconsistent decisions, but the “rarity of such award nonetheless
shows that investment jurisprudence is largely consistent.” SCHILL, supra note 1, at 356. Even
assuming a general de facto precedent, these awards are becoming less rare, and the substantial
impact and potential future occurrence of unpredictable awards not only greatly affects a state’s
economy—with awards reaching the hundreds of millions of dollars—but undermines the
legitimacy of the entire investment regime. See generally supra Section IV. What is needed is
not a “weak” system of precedent followed by many, but not all, of arbitrators. What is needed
is a system of strong persuasive precedent that is coherently and consistently applied to
investment disputes, as proposed in this Article.
248. KURTZ, supra note 163, at 251.
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regime matters more than the potential “correctness” of a single
result.249
The purpose of this proposed World Investment Court would be
to create consistency and centralize the Court around tenured judges
rather than new arbitrators each dispute. There are many benefits to
consistency in international investment law, including equality in
investment protection, predictability in award outcomes, and enhanced
legitimacy of the international regime. 250 This ideal of consistency
promoted here is based on this empirical information and the necessity
of consistent interpretation of similar wordings. Arbitrators in a sense
are lawmakers,251 but unlike private arbitration, investment law creates
a distinct impact on both the theoretical sphere—state sovereignty—
and the practical sphere—as an award against a state likewise affects
all people within its boundaries. The legitimacy of these arbitral
tribunals can be improved by the creation of a well-developed
jurisprudence.252
The WTO dispute settlement system is one of the most effective
international judiciaries. 253 The Appellate Body of the WTO has
already greatly contributed to the coherence of trade law and
organizational integrity,254 and this predictability based on a coherent
body of law allows states to rely on past decisions and anticipate the
outcome of future disputes. 255 One of the predominant reasons the
WTO dispute system is so popular compared to other international
courts is the high consistency of the Appellate Body and its coherent
249. Goldhaber, supra note 172, at 408.
250. Charles H. Brower II, Structure, Legitimacy, and NAFTA’s Investment Chapter, 36
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 37, 51 (2003) (“[I]nternational legal regimes depend for their survival
on perceptions of legitimacy. . . . To generate perceptions of legitimacy, legal regimes must
operate predictably, conform to historical practice, and incorporate fundamental values shared
by the governed community.”).
251. D. Brian King & Rahim Moloo, International Arbitrators As Lawmakers, 46 N.Y.U.
J. INT’L L. & POL. 875, 877 (2014) (“We begin from the standpoint that regardless of whether,
normatively speaking, one believes that arbitrators should perform a lawmaking function, the
fact is that they do. Arbitrators regularly cite to prior awards, appear to consider themselves
cabined by them to some extent, and demonstrate concern about the impact that the awards they
render may have on the development of the law.”).
252. VALENTINA VADI, ANALOGIES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND
ARBITRATION 143 (2016).
253. DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 305 (2d ed. 2004).
254. KURTZ, supra note 163, at 5.
255. Erin E. Gleason, International Arbitral Appeals: What Are We So Afraid of?, 7 PEPP.
DISP. RESOL. L.J. 269, 274 (2007).
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commitment to precedent. 256 As the jurisprudence of the WTO has
steadily become consistent, the number of cases brought has also
declined.257 This proposed World Investment Court would be a major
leap forward in creating a coherent body of international investment
law and enhancing the legitimacy of the international investment
framework.258
However, the consistency proposed here would not necessarily be
consistency in substance of awards, as two similar cases can have
different outcomes and still be consistent. The benefit of consistency
that would be realized by a World Investment Court would be the
consistency in procedure in addition to consistency in interpretation of
similar or identical provisions. Yet consistency must be in the
independent check for legal correctness, not simply consistency
itself. 259 This consistency in correct legal procedure and accurate
interpretation, but not necessarily in substance, would ensure the
protection of foreign investments while still maintaining a flexibility
towards the substance of disputes. By doing so, the proposed appellate
body of the World Investment Court would make international
investment dispute resolution more democratic and ensure the
independence and impartiality of the judges.260
V. ARGUMENTS AGAINST WORLD INVESTMENT COURT AND
RESPONSES TO THESE CRITICISMS
While a World Investment Court would produce substantial
benefits in the rule of law, consistency, and predictability, all vital in
256 . David A. Gantz, Impact of WTO and Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, in
ESTABLISHING JUDICIAL AUTHORITY, supra note 122, at 31, 41.
257. WANG, supra note 36, at 571.
258. Irene M. Ten Cate, International Arbitration and the Ends of Appellate Review, 44
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1109, 1204 (2012) (“A permanent appeals facility makes more sense
than ad hoc appellate solutions, in light of the stated purpose of promoting the development of
a coherent body of law.”). See also Steven Donziger et al., The Clash of Human Rights and Bit
Investor Claims: Chevron’s Abusive Litigation in Ecuador’s Amazon, HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Winter
2010, at 8, 14 (“Indeed, even an “international investment court” of the sort proposed by leading
academics would go a long way toward clarifying the proper jurisdiction of investment disputes,
the latitude of states to act in the public interest, and the rights available to affected third
parties.”).
259. KURTZ, supra note 163, at 548.
260. See Stephan W. Schill, Reforming Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS):
Conceptual Framework and Options for the Way Forward, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR
TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 8 (July 2015) http://e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads
/2015/07/E15-Investment-Schill-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/UW7D-WUZP] (archived Oct.
21, 2017).
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international investment law, there may be some trade-offs for these
benefits.261 Many have been critical of Van Harten’s proposal for an
international investment court, 262 and have put forth several
countervailing arguments against this proposed World Investment
Court.
A. Policies Against a World Investment Court
The most concerning of these arguments is the idea that a global
investment court would restrict the sovereignty of states more than the
current arbitral system. 263 Generally, states prefer international
arbitration because it provides at least some control over the
appointment of arbitrators on the panel, unlike with permanent
courts. 264 Furthermore, some believe this constant pursuit of
consistency may lead to a court with little accountability to the states,
which in turn could greatly effect a state’s economy.265 The pursuit of
consistency may lead to a decrease in accuracy and sincerity, as judges
would be more deferential to precedent rather than simply focusing on
getting the decision correct,266 leading some to say we should abandon
this principle of consistency to focus on the quality of arbitral
decisions.267

261. Frank, supra note 127, at 99.
262. See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law. by Gus Van
Harten. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. Pp. Xxxii, 214, 184. Index. $145,
ì60, Cloth; $65, ì24, Paper, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 909, 915 (2008) (book review) (“While there
may indeed be cogent reasons to establish an international investment court, Van Harten’s book
does not articulate them.”).
263 . Jason Webb Yackee, Controlling the International Investment Law Agency, 53
HARV. INT’L L.J. 391, 434 (2012) (“A World Investment Court, unless carefully designed as
more of a political than a judicial organ, would risk further consolidating the law-making
functions of IIL experts while diminishing the ability of states to control system outcomes.”).
264. Catherine A. Rogers, The Politics of International Investment Arbitrators, 12 SANTA
CLARA J. INT’L L. 217, 251-52 (2013) (“States have a long history of preferring international
tribunals in which they can control, to some extent, the composition the panel the decision-maker
panel. . . . [and arbitration] allow[s] States a degree of control over the adjudicatory decisionmaker that eludes them with traditional, independent, permanent tribunals.”).
265. See Franck, supra note 56, at 1601 (“Although having one permanent court consider
issues of public international law would help create a coherent body of investment treaty
jurisprudence, there is still no check on the court’s discretion should the court simply ‘get it
wrong.’ Where crucial international rights are at stake and a large damage award could wreak
havoc with a developing nation’s economy, ‘getting it right’ is vital.”).
266 . Irene M. Ten Cate, The Costs of Consistency: Precedent in Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 418, 420 (2013)
267. Id. at 420-21.
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Similarly, while a World Investment Court may create
consistency in decisions—beneficial though it may lead to lowering
FDI risk and giving states a framework for future actions—it could also
enhance legitimacy concerns, as this would increase the concern that
an international court would develop international law and create
precedent states do not approve.268 This argument is based on the same
idea that a permanent court may be less deferential to state sovereignty,
and could make the system less attractive to the states, and in turn, less
legitimate. 269 Indeed, Professor Stephen Schill argues that investorstate arbitration is worth keeping despite its flaws because it better
balances accountability of states with a limited invasion of their
sovereignty.270 Finally, while a permanent panel of judges may bring
an increased sense of impartiality, the problem lies with determining
who would appoint the panel that would be considered by all to be
legitimate.271
B. Responses to these Criticisms
Again, this Article is not proposing that the current system is not
legitimate, nor does it suggest the problems international investment
law has are too significant to overcome. While the current investment
system has some problems that need attention, principally
unpredictability and incoherence, many believe “a solution will come
with the passage of time.”272 This Article instead proposes that a World
Investment Court with tenured judges would be that solution, resolving
many of the criticisms against the current arbitral system and creating
a more perfect dispute resolution framework.273
268. Stephen W. Schill, The Sixth Path: Reforming Investment Law from Within, in
RESHAPING THE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM: JOURNEYS FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 621, 632-33 (J. E. Kalicki & A. Joubin-Bret 2015).
269. See Jason W. Yackee, Controlling the International Investment Law Agency, 53
HARV. INT’L L.J. 391, 434 (2012) (“A World Investment Court, unless carefully designed as
more of a political than a judicial organ, would risk further consolidating the law-making
functions of IIL experts while diminishing the ability of states to control system outcomes.”).
270. See Schill, supra note 268.
271. Park, supra note 154, at 658-59.
272. Brower & Schill, supra note 68, at 473.
273 . See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Reform of the Investor-state
Dispute Settlement: In Search of a Roadmap, 9 (June 2013) (“A standing investment court would
be an institutional public good serving the interests of investors, States and other stakeholders.
The court would address most of the problems outlined above: it would go a long way to ensure
the legitimacy and transparency of the system, facilitate consistency and curacy of decisions and
ensure independence and impartiality of adjudicators.”).

40

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41:1

The two counterarguments to an investment court above rely on
the valid concern that independent judges would infringe on the
sovereignty of states because they are no longer directly accountable to
the states. If judges are tenured and do not need to satisfy the parties
for repeat appointments, this could give little incentive to actually
appeal to the states and their sovereignty. These arguments are valid
and can give rise to concerns, but there are solutions to ensure there is
less chance of this occurring.
But there are many practical benefits to having a World
Investment Court with tenured judges, which overcome this perceived
disadvantage of less accountability to states. 274 This lesser
accountability may actually be beneficial to international law as a
whole, because rather than focusing on pleasing the states or investors,
the judges will be focused on attaining the right result, as a judge’s job
is to make the international investment agreement the best vehicle for
achieving the purpose it was designed to serve.275
But simply because a judge is independent does not mean that
judges have no constraints on their actions. 276 Professors Laurence
Helfer and Anne-Maurie Slaughter have provided a compelling theory
of “constrained independence,” where even after the independent
tribunal is created, states can still have a second-level control to prevent
judicial overreach.277 There are practical ways to check this court in the
structure, including having shorter tenure along with political control
mechanisms. Furthermore, just as reputation promotes state
compliance with dispute resolution awards, 278 a good reputation is
necessary for judges, otherwise states would refuse to consent to the
World Investment Court’s jurisdiction, just as some have with the
current investment arbitral system. Additionally, as proposed in this
Article, states would appoint these judges through the WTO, and due
to states’ conflicting interests in investment protection, they would be
274. Posner & Yoo, supra note 167, at 25. But Posner & Yoo argue that because of the
difference with which domestic courts and international courts operate, “effectiveness and
independence are, at best, uncorrelated and may be negatively correlated.” Id. at 28. But see
Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A
Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REV. 899 (2005) (responding to Posner &
Yoo and identifying weaknesses in the argument).
275. See LAWRENCE SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
PRACTICE 34 (2004).
276. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 176, at 904. (2005)
277. Id. at 942.
278. Rachel Brewster, Pricing Compliance: When Formal Remedies Displace Reputational Sanctions, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 259, 259-60 (2013).
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inclined to appoint impartial judges to the Court. In sum, this Article
hopefully demonstrates the benefits outweigh the costs of a World
Investment Court and constructs a reliable system, so in the future the
WTO can do the same.
VI. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT COURT OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION
Notably, the European Union and Canada recently agreed to
develop a permanent investment court under the EU-Canada
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement to better protect
investment and resolve investment disputes,279 and the European Union
and Vietnam recently concluded a BIT which included an investment
court.280 In 2015, prior to these agreements, the European Commission
issued its Concept Paper to the United States proposing the reform of
the current arbitral system under the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (“TTIP”), suggesting the formation of an
international investment court. 281 Many, including the European
Union, have noted this is a radical change from the current system of
international investment dispute resolution, but one the European
Union is attempting to spread. 282 The final goal of this proposal is to
make this tribunal, along with the E.U.-Vietnam tribunal and the TTIP
court, into a multilateral investment court and replace all investment
dispute resolution mechanisms in E.U. investment agreements.283

279. European Commission, CETA: EU and Canada agree on new approach on investment
in trade agreement, IP/16/399 (Feb. 29, 2016).
280. The EU and Vietnam finalise landmark trade deal, EUR. COMM. (Dec. 2, 2015),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1409
[https://perma.cc/U7VU-ZWLN]
(archived Oct. 21, 2017).
281. European Commission, Concept Paper: Investment in TTIPand Beyond – the Path
for Reform: Enhancing the Right to Regulate and Moving from Current ad hoc Arbitration
Towards an Investment Court (May 5, 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/
tradoc_153408.PDF [https://perma.cc/N5KU-WX7D] (archived Oct. 21, 2017).
282. European Commission, A Future Multilateral Investment Court, MEMO/16/4350
(Dec. 13, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-4350_en.htm [https://
perma.cc/9FTL-4923] (archived Oct. 21, 2017). See also Georgios Dimitropoulos, Constructing
the Independence of International Investment Arbitrators: Past, Present and Future, 36 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 371, 424 (2016). Cf. Brower & Schill, supra note 68, at 475 (noting this
proposal is “less-radical” than a return to state-to-state arbitration).
283. The Multilateral Investment Court Project, EUR. COMM. (Dec. 21, 2016), http://trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1608 [https://perma.cc/B8BQ-KMYX] (archived Oct.
21, 2017). See also Belen Olmos Giupponi, Recent Developments in the EU Investment Policy:
Towards an Investment World Court?, 26 J. ARB. STUD. 175, 210 (2016).
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A. Construction of the TTIP Investment Court System
This Article will not describe in detail the proposed TTIP or other
EU investment court systems, as the actual future construction of the
court is yet unknown, as negotiations are ongoing at this time. But it
would be useful to look at some of the proposed aspects of the courts
and the critiques surrounding them. In the TTIP Concept Paper to the
United States, the proposed court would be comprised of a Court of
First Instance consisting of fifteen judges total, five nationals of the
United States, five nationals of the European Union, and five nationals
of third countries.284 These judges would be tenured for six-year terms
renewable once, and all must have the “qualifications required in their
respective countries for appointment to judicial office, or be jurists of
recognised competence.”285 The Court of First Instance will hear cases
in panels of three judges randomly appointed by the President of the
Tribunal, with one judge each from the United States, the European
Union, and a third country, and chaired by the judge from a third
country.286 Additionally, these judges would each be paid a monthly
retainer fee, which may be turned into a salary.287
In a few respects, the Court of First Instance borrows some its
structure from arbitration. For example, the panel would be comprised
similarly to an arbitral panel, as one judge each will be from each
party’s country, one party will be from the United States and the other
from the European Union, with a third-country (presumably neutral)
judge presiding. Similarly, the rules of the court do not necessarily
differ greatly from that of an arbitration, as the proposal allows
claimants to submit disputes to the Tribunal under ICSID Rules,
UNCITRAL Rules, or any other rules agreed to by the parties.288 But
where it varies substantially is in the composition of the panel, as the
parties have significantly less influence over the appointment process.
But the greatest difference—and arguably the most significant
benefit—is the appellate procedure. The Appellate Tribunal would be
comprised of six judges, two from the United States, two from the
284. Giupponi, supra note 283, at 219.
285. Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Trade in Services, Investment and
E-Commerce: Chapter II — Investment, EUROPEAN COMM’N 17 (Nov. 12, 2015),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/september/tradoc_153807.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U6SA-S3F5] (archived Oct. 21, 2017).
286. Id. art. 9(2).
287. Id. art. 9(12), (15).
288. Id. art. 6(2).
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European Union, and two from third countries, appointed for six year
terms.289 Like the Court of First Instance, the appellate panel hearing
disputes would consist of three justices, one from each category, and
chaired by the national of a third country.290 Either party may appeal
the decision of the Court of First Instance within 90 days, but the
grounds for appeal are limited to: (1) that the Tribunal erred in the
interpretation or application of the applicable law; (2) that the Tribunal
manifestly erred in the appreciation of the facts, or (3) those provided
for in Article 52 of the ICSID Convention.291 If the appeal is rejected,
the award is final, but the Appeal Tribunal may reverse or modify the
legal findings or conclusions.292 Once the award is final, it is binding
and the Parties must recognize and enforce the award, which is not
subject to any annulment procedure.293
B. Potential Issues of the Proposed E.U. Permanent Investment Court
While the Permanent Investment Court under the TTIP and EU
BITs is a bold move forward, some scholars have noted problems with
the forthcoming bilateral investment courts. 294 The most significant
issue is that the Court is only bilateral, primarily because, while the
hope of the European Commission is to create a multilateral court, the
composition of the Proposed Court—third of the justices from
European Union and third of the justices from the United States—may
actually solidify its bilateral nature and make it increasingly difficult to
replace in the future.295 Additionally, the proposed investment court
fails to integrate domestic courts in the dispute resolution, as foreign
investors can skip pursuing remedies in the domestic court and simply
go to the permanent investment court, giving foreign investors a
potential advantage over domestic investors.296 Other concerns stem
289. Id. art. 10(2).
290. Id. art. 10(8).
291. Id. art. 29(1).
292. Id. art. 29(2).
293. Id. art. 30(1-2).
294 . See, e.g., Stephen W. Schill, The European Commission’s Proposal of an
“Investment Court System” for TTIP: Stepping Stone or Stumbling Block for Multilateralizing
International Investment Law?, 20 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 9 (2016); Gus Van Harten, Key Flaws
in the European Commission’s Proposals for Foreign Investor Protection in TTIP, 12 OSGOODE
HALL LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER SERIES 1 (2016); Szilárd Gáspár-Szilágyi, A Standing
Investment Court under TTIP from the Perspective of the Court of Justice of the European
Union, 17 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 701 (2016).
295. See Schill, supra note 294.
296. Id.; Van Harten, supra note 294, at 6.
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from the high costs, the institution of the court, and the initiation of the
court’s jurisdiction. 297 The proposed international investment court
under the TTIP and the other EU BITs would need to address these
issues, particularly those problems in the structural design, if it does
not want to prevent a multilateral permanent investment court in the
future. It is an imperfect solution to a difficult problem, but a problem
that can be addressed through a multilateral investment court.298
A truly World Investment Court would address most of the
concerns the TTIP Proposal elicits. Broadening the membership of the
investment court would make appointing the judges more democratic,
and would resolve the entrenchment or additional obstacle problem
noted by Professor Schill. But the World Investment Court must begin
as multilateral to address these concerns. Many of the other concerns
deal directly with the E.U. BITs rather than the court itself, such as the
potential “advantage” of not pursuing domestic remedies first, and
these concerns would have to be addressed in the investment
agreements. Additionally, the Appellate Panel would be able to satisfy
the consistency concern, as over time, the court can develop a
consistent and coherent definition and application of provisions such
as the most-favored nation clause or the scope of “investment.”299
VII. CONSTRUCTION OF THIS PROPOSED WORLD
INVESTMENT COURT
As described above, predictability and security in the international
regime are beneficial—and arguably necessary—to the formation of
international law.300 This Part will describe an idea of how a World
Investment Court in practice could be instituted and operated. While
297. Giupponi, supra note 283, at 228-29.
298. See Anibal Sabater, Foreign Investment Arbitration in the Global Interdependent
Economy, 1 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 131, 136 (2009) (concluding that “with all its imperfections,
arbitration still remains an effective way to resolve investment disputes. It may be perfected, it
may be replaced with a supranational investment court, but it cannot be credibly buried without
having an alternative in place.”).
299. Robert W. Schwieder, TTIP and the Investment Court System: A New (and
Improved?) Paradigm for Investor-State Adjudication, 55 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 178, 223
(2016).
300. See Shoaib A. Ghias, International Judicial Lawmaking: A Theoretical and Political
Analysis of the WTO Appellate Body, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 534, 552–53 (2006) (“Dispute
resolution is considered important because of the need to add predictability and security to the
international trading system. However, binding dispute resolution not only strengthens the
system, it also remakes the system. The WTO’s Appellate Body is remaking international trade
by moving into policy areas beyond the WTO Agreement.”).
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the model proposed under the TTIP provides a viable reference point
to begin this hypothetical investment court, this proposed court would
be created to address the current concerns over the proposed E.U.
investment court system. To begin, the investment court should
preferably be created under the auspices of the WTO, as there currently
is no supranational entity for regulating FDI, and the closest regulatory
organization would be the WTO. Additionally, while history has kept
investment and trade from being regulated jointly, both are
connected, 301 as our global economy is based on two foundations:
international trade and international investment, 302 and FDI plays a
fundamental role in the global economy.303
A. Structure and Appointment
Like many modern international tribunals, this World Investment
Court would not be a judicial court in the domestic sense. Similar to
the court currently under the WTO, this proposed World Investment
Court would consist of a Lower Court and an Appellate Body. The total
number of judges on the Lower Court is arbitrary at this stage in this
hypothetical court, so long as the number is a multiple of three. But due
to the multilateral nature of this proposed court and the growing
number of investment disputes, the number of judges would need to
correspondingly increase. These judges would be appointed through
the WTO by the contracting states, as the appointment procedure would
need to be controlled by a committee of states to ensure “that the ISDS
system is subject to democratic control, to be exercised jointly by the
contracting parties.”304
Regarding length of term, tenure preferably would be six years,
non-renewable and a third of the judges’ terms staggered every other
year, similar to the European Court of Justice. 305 A shorter term of
service would arguably address the concerns states may have regarding
the accountability problem discussed above. States may be concerned
that these independent judges would be indifferent to encroachments
301. KURTZ, supra note 163, at 16.
302. Fedorchuk, supra note 135, at 6.
303. See generally Charles O. Roehrdanz, Reducing the U.S.-Japan Trade Deficit by
Eliminating Japanese Barriers to Foreign Direct Investment, 4 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 305
(1995).
304. SCHILL, supra note 8, at 9.
305. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art.
253, 2012 O.J. C 326/47, at 158 (providing judges on the Court have six year terms).
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on state sovereignty, but a relatively shorter term would allow the
contracting states to appoint judges perceived to be more balanced
towards state sovereignty and investor protection. 306 Yet the nonrenewable factor will maintain the independence of the judges, as there
is little incentive to be partial to either side when there is no way to
extend a judge’s tenure and no way to remove a judge in retaliation.
The Appellate Body would be comprised of nine justices, with the
entire panel hearing appeals from the Lower Court. Its power would be
broadened from the current annulment grounds, allowing the Appellate
Body to modify or reverse legal findings or conclusions from the Court
of First Instance, similar to the current provision in the EU-Vietnam
BIT.307 But another significant deviation from the current system is the
appointment process. Presumably, the WTO Secretariat or another
position created to oversee the investment court would propose several
candidates, and those candidates would be approved by the contracting
states to the WTO.308 The rationale behind requiring a broad consensus
is that states give their general consent to all future disputes under
investment treaties, and there is no certainty to if and when a state or a
state’s investor would be before the investment court. Therefore, all the
contracting states would have an interest in appointing the judges.
The most significant difference here to the investment courts
proposed under the EU BITs would be the multilateral nature of this
proposed permanent global investment court. Numerous criticisms
towards the proposed investment court under the TTIP and EU BITs
are that the court is bilateral and may actually harm future expansions
to a multilateral one. The WTO would be the best place to establish this
World Investment Court, 309 as most countries are contracting states.
306. Cf. Charles N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, What’s in A Meme? The Truth About
Investor-State Arbitration: Why It Need Not, and Must Not, Be Repossessed by States, 52
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 689, 769 (2014) (arguing that “any proposal to ‘regulate’ arbitrators
in a manner that makes states the gatekeepers of who is eligible for appointment will undermine
the very purpose of investor-State arbitration and should be rejected.”).
307. See Bilateral Investment Treaty, E.U.-Viet., art. 28(3).
308. Cf. World Trade Organization, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes, art. 8.6 (Apr. 15, 1994) [hereinafter WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding], https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu_e.htm [https://perma.cc/
4LUD-FVRD] (archived Oct. 21, 2017) (providing that the Secretariat shall propose
nominations for the panel to only the parties to the dispute, and the parties agree whether to
approve).
309. The connection between investment and trade is beyond the scope of this particular
Article, but is the subject of my next work. See David M. Howard, The Need for a Supernational
Organization in Foreign Investment, 8 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. (forthcoming 2018).
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Beginning with a multilateral investment court under the WTO would
resolve at least most of these concerns and provide a solid foundation—
including establishing the court’s legitimacy—for the future legal
disputes brought before the court.
B. Rules and Precedent
Similar to the WTO Appellate Body now, the World Investment
Court appellate body would draw up its own working procedures rather
than follow the TTIP and EU proposals.310 Once the Appellate Body is
formed, the tenured members of the panel would create its own
procedure in consultation with the WTO Secretary-General. This
includes setting time-limits and procedures, such a presenting evidence
to the Appellate Body, and the procedure for rotation of judges to hear
appeals.311
Precedent is another issue that needs to be discussed, as this is the
foundation for consistency and a coherent body of law. Arbitrators
already frequently reference and cite previous investment awards
creating a type of de facto persuasive precedent, 312 but this still
produces inconsistent decisions as not all arbitrators follow this
principle.313 However, in this proposed World Investment Court, the
Appellate Body would review the Lower Court’s legal judgments de
novo and jurisdiction of the Appellate Body would generally be limited
to the issues of law. Judgments would be published, and like the
WTO, 314 prior decisions would be given persuasive precedential
authority for subsequent cases in the Lower Court on issues of the
law,315 providing the Lower Court a framework of legal authority on
which to decide disputes brought to the Court.316 This type of precedent
For a general discussion of the connection between trade and international investment, see
generally KURTZ, supra note 163.
310. See WTO Disupute Settlement Understanding, supra note 308, art. 17(9).
311. MERRILLS, supra note 9, at 207.
312. SCHILL, supra note 1, at 321-23.
313. Supra section IV(d).
314. Joost Pauwelyn, Minority Rules: Precedent and Participation, in ESTABLISHING
JUDICIAL AUTHORITY, supra note 122, at 141, 146-47.
315. See Tai-Heng Cheng, Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 30
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1014, 1017 (2007) (“Precedent, or stare decisis, refers the doctrine under
which a court, when deciding a point of law, generally follows a holding of a prior court on that
point if that prior court is equal or superior in the judicial hierarchy.”).
316 . Gary Born, International Adjudication, 61 DUKE L.J. 775, 847 (2012) (“[T]he
tribunal’s awards were published and provide frequently cited authority on a range of
international-law issues, including expropriation, nationality, remedies, and procedures.”).

48

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41:1

where the Court would stick to its prior decisions absent compelling
reasons would contribute to a more consistent and coherent body of
investment law, yet would allow the Lower Court to decide or
distinguish prior decisions based on the facts and specific issues in the
case. Yet when it comes to issues such as whether the most-favored
nation clause applies to procedural provisions, 317 there would be a
consistent application of this precedent of law to the facts of the
specific dispute.
C. Will This Court Ever Happen?
While this World Investment Court may “seem too ambitious to
be politically feasible” to some318 or even impossible,319 with the recent
proposals by the European Union for the creation of bilateral
investment courts, there appears to be growing political will for a
World Investment Court. FDI flows continue to increase, and many are
looking for improvements to the current investment arbitral system.
This Article proposes that a World Investment Court is that
improvement.
To solve cooperation dilemmas between states, states tend to turn
to international courts as functional solutions to overcome problems
through collective coordination and to promote the states’
legitimacy.320 International institutions are created because states will
be better off by committing themselves to a set of common rules and
principles. 321 While many highly doubt the probability of a World

317. See supra section IV(d)(ii).
318. David P. Riesenberg, Fee Shifting in Investor-State Arbitration: Doctrine and Policy
Justifying Application of the English Rule, 60 DUKE L.J. 977, 989 (2011).
319. Chiara Giorgetti, Who Decides Who Decides in International Investment Arbitration?,
35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 431, 463 (2013) (“Gus Van Harten suggests the creation of a permanent
international investment court. The reality is that it would be just impossible to negotiate the
creation of another permanent court and to find the will and interest to negotiate the creation of
a new institution.”).
320. See, e.g., Firew Kebede Tiba, What Caused the Multiplicity of International Courts
and Tribunals?, 10 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 202, 204 (2006); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and
Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REV. 899, 904 (2005). But see Suzanne Katzenstein, In the Shadow of Crisis:
The Creation of International Courts in the Twentieth Century, 55 HARV. INT’L L.J. 151 (2014).
Cf. Posner & Yoo, supra note 176, at 6 (noting “international adjudication can play a useful role
by enabling states to overcome a limited set of cooperation problems in international affairs”).
321. Krzyztof J. Pelc, Welfare Implications of Precedent, in ESTABLISHING JUDICIAL
AUTHORITY, supra note 122, at 173, 183.
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Investment Court’s implementation, 322 claiming the political will is
just not sufficient for a multilateral agreement on this issue,323 there is
a growing hope that this court could be implemented in the near
future.324 In the past few decades, the political influence and strength
of international law has increased, and international courts have exerted
significant influence on legal developments.325
Certainly, it will be difficult to create this proposed World
Investment Court. Practically, this would require the creation of new
Secretariat positions and panels to expand the capacity of the WTO.326
Politically, it may require amendment of the WTO Agreements to
include investment under the organization’s jurisdiction,327 and states
will not create or consent to the jurisdiction of a court unless they
benefit from it, namely by forcing other states to appear before the
court. 328 But difficulty in practice should not prevent the
implementation of a better system, and as this Article proposes the
World Investment Court to be instituted under the WTO, the Court
could be created through that process rather than as a free-standing
body, at least until a supranational organization is tasked with the
regulation of foreign investment.

322. Stephan W. Schill, Enhancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy:
Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law Approach, 52 VA. J. INT’L
L. 57, 69 (2011).
323. Giorgetti, supra note 319, at 463 (“Gus Van Harten suggests the creation of a World
Investment Court. The reality is that it would be just impossible to negotiate the creation of
another permanent court and to find the will and interest to negotiate the creation of a new
institution.”); David D. Caron, The Nature of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the
Evolving Structure of International Dispute Resolution, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 104, 116 (1990)
(“[O]n the international level, there often is no alternative to arbitration. In many international
situations, neither party will agree to submit all possible disputes to the courts of the other.”).
324. See Cecilia Malmström, The way ahead for an international investment court, EUR.
COMM. (July 18, 2016), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/
malmstrom/blog/way-ahead-international-investment-court_en [https://perma.cc/WJE5-CKG2]
(archived Nov. 2, 2017); Rebecca Lee Katz, Modeling an International Investment Court After
the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body, 22 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 163-64 (2016).
325 . Joanna Jemielniak et al., Introduction, in ESTABLISHING JUDICIAL AUTHORITY,
supra note 122, 1.
326. Greg Tereposky & Laura Nielsen, Coordinated Actions in International Economic
Law as Illustrated by Investment Treaty Arbitration and World Trade Organization Disputes, in
ESTABLISHING JUDICIAL AUTHORITY, supra note 122, at 119, 137.
327. José E. Alvarez & Steve Charnovitz, Triangulating the World Trade Organization,
96 AM. J. INT’L L. 28, 29 (2002).
328. Posner & Yoo, supra note 176, at 25.
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There is a strong case for the implementation of a World
Investment Court under the WTO.329 The WTO has broad consensus,
and while it has not always been successful in negotiating previous
investment agreements,330 there are several factors that may ignite this
“political will.” First, this proposal would give states control over the
appointment process rather than giving both investors and states
control.331 And as states have conflicting interests in appointing judges,
because states want to protect themselves from suits while
simultaneously protecting their own investors against infringements by
other countries, this would ensure impartial and independent judges are
appointed. 332
International legal crises play an important role in the formation
of an international court due to challenges to an existing legal
regime. 333 With the growth of investment disputes and the rising
number of inconsistent decisions, the underlying foundation of
investment arbitration is currently being challenged. Furthermore, this
centralization of investment disputes would provide consistency and
coherence for states to know interpretations of their IIAs to better
protect themselves from claims. So while “mustering the political will
to enact and ratify such a convention might well prove taxing,” it is “by
far the most practical approach.”334 There seems to be at least some will
“mustering” as the European Union, Vietnam, and Canada have all
agreed to a permanent investment court, so a future multilateral
investment court is a more likely proposition than it was a decade
ago.335 But even once the Court is created, the legitimacy of the court
329. Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50
HARV. INT’L L.J. 435, 484 (2009) (noting the current research “creates a strong case for the
creation of an appellate body or even a stand-alone investment court.”).
330. See Kevin C. Kennedy, A WTO Agreement on Investment: A Solution in Search of A
Problem?, 24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 77, 87–88 (2003) (“Despite the legal and economic
arguments for liberalizing national barriers to FDI, the failure of the OECD to conclude the MAI
by 1998 should be a sobering reminder that successfully negotiating a comprehensive
multilateral agreement on investment is a supremely difficult task.”).
331. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, supra note 306, at 768.
332. See supra note 176-77 and accompanying text.
333. Suzanne Katzenstein, In the Shadow of Crisis: The Creation of International Courts
in the Twentieth Century, 55 HARV. INT’L L.J. 151, 153 (2014).
334. Franck, supra note 56, at 1625.
335. Cf. Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, [Symposium] The Overwhelming Merits of Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 263, 269 (2009) (“If the governments
of the world preferred an international investment court to arbitration, or saw a need for a court
of international arbitral appeals, they could constitute one; they have not.”). This argument,
however, simply dismisses the fact that a multilateral agreement on essentially anything is

2017]

WORLD INVESTMENT COURT

51

may still be founded on its continuing success and how the Court
accomplishes its proposed functions.336
VIII. CONCLUSION
This Article proposes what is hoped to be a convincing argument
for the establishment of a World Investment Court designed to resolve
investment disputes brought by foreign investors against states. FDI
continues to be a fundamental pillar of our global economy, and
consistent and coherent decisions are necessary to protect investor
rights and promote the flow of foreign investment while providing
states with a framework of laws on which to base future regulatory
actions. Because of the public-law nature of investment dispute
resolution, consistency is essential to the legitimacy of a dispute
resolution body, and a World Investment Court created under the WTO
would not only create a more consistent body of international
investment law, but would firmly promote the legitimacy of the
international investment regime. It would also enhance the
multilateralization of the current investment system by further
establishing a more uniform international legal framework that is
coherent and stable.337
While international investment law is still in its infancy, 338 it
seems to be moving in the right direction. With the proposal to create
a bilateral investment court under the EU treaties, more countries may
be enticed to adopt this practice. These proposals have been met with
harsh criticisms from scholars, but these critiques can aid in forming a
fully-functioning World Investment Court, primarily one that begins as
a multilateral court rather than under a single BIT. As international law
matures, the visibility of its legitimacy must increase, including the
incredibly difficult. Just as many have seen a need for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment,
yet several negotiations for this Agreement have failed, does not mean that simply because there
is not an agreement so far means that the current system is the most effective. International
agreements take time to negotiate, and with the few proposals under E.U. investment treaties for
this international investment court, these negotiations are just beginning. See, e.g., José E.
Alvarez, A Bit on Custom, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 17, 79 (2009) (“The ideal some would
urge in lieu of the status quo—the will-o-the-wisp of a multilateral investment treaty coupled
with a single investment court—is politically difficult in a world that has repeatedly failed in
prior comparable efforts.”).
336 . Geir Ulfstein, International Courts and Judges: Independence, Interaction, and
Legitimacy, 46 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 849, 866 (2014).
337. See SCHILL, supra note 1, at 363-64 (arguing that “international investment law is
evolving toward a multilateral system based on bilateral treaties”).
338. COLE, supra note 82, at xiv-xv.
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public perception of arbitrator independence and predictability in its
body of law. 339 This proposed World Investment Court will benefit
both investors and states, and states would have an interest in this court
as it should advance both their individual interests and the legitimacy
of international investment law as a whole.340

339. Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, Judicial Ethics in International Economic Law, in
ESTABLISHING JUDICIAL AUTHORITY, supra note 122, at 215, 239.
340 . SCHILL, supra note 1, at 106. See also JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF
INVESTMENT TREATIES 8 (2d ed., 2015).

